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Abstract 
 
 
BEFORE THE PARABLE: THE READER'S TRIAL 
 
 
Duygu Yeni 
 
Cultural Studies, MA Thesis, 2011 
 
Prof. Dr. Sibel Irzık 
 
 
Keywords: parable, ambiguity, literary reading, interpretation, metaphor 
 
 
This study aims to explore in depth the structure of Kafka’s “The Trial” by starting off 
from the fundamental question how it shapes the writers’s, the protagonist’s and the 
reader’s status with respect to the work. The main argument of the study is that the 
structure of the work is such that it reduces all three parties to a very similar, almost 
indistinguishable position, the position of not knowing. Thus, the trial is as much a 
question of life and death to Kafka and the reader as it is to Josef K. What lies at the 
heart of the trial is the inescapablity and the impossiblity of reading that which has not 
been written yet; and thus breathing life to the work, “The Trial”. Kafka, Josef K. and 
the reader find themselves before the inexplicable parable, and are being called to read, 
and thus write it. Kafka, Josef K., and the reader are arrested by the same call; the call is 
nothing other than an invitation to read and thus to participate in the ambiguity, or in 
other words, in the parable. 
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Özet 
 
 
MESELĐN ÖNÜNDE: OKURUN DAVASI 
 
 
Duygu Yeni 
 
Kültürel Çalışmalar, MA Tezi, 2011 
 
Prof. Dr. Sibel Irzık 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: mesel, anlamda muğlaklık, edebi okuma, yorumlama, metafor 
 
 
Bu çalışma Kafka’nın “Dava” adlı eserinin yazar, kahraman ve okurun konumlarını 
nasıl şekillendirdiği ana sorusundan yola çıkarak eserin yapısını derinlemesine 
incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Çalışmanın temel argümanı, eserin yapısının bu üç unsuru 
da birbirine çok benzer, neredeyse birbirinden ayırt edilemez bir pozisyona, bilmeme 
pozisyonuna, indirgediğidir. Bu yüzden dava, en az Josef K. için olduğu kadar Kafka ve 
okur için de ölüm kalım meselesidir. Davanın kalbini oluşturan, henüz yazılmamış olanı 
okumanın ve böylece esere, yani “Dava”’ya, hayat vermenin kaçınılmazlığı ve 
imkânsızlığıdır. Kafka, Josef K. ve okur kendini muammanın karşısında bulur ve bu 
muammayı okumaya, yani onu yazmaya çağırılır. Kafka, Josef K. ve okur aynı çağrı 
tarafından tutuklanır; bu çağrı, okumaya ve böylelikle muğlaklığın, yani meselin, bir 
parçası olmaya davetten başka bir şey değildir.  
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INTRODUCTION─ KAFKA: LIVING (IN) THE PARABLE 
 
 
 
 
                             I live completely entangled in life. (1914) 
 
        Kafka, The Diaries of Franz Kafka 
 
“But for me…it is a horrible double life from which there is probably no escape 
but insanity”1 Kafka lives most of his life in suspension, afloat, where the life he wants 
to live and the life he is expected to live fail to meet. He does not ask much from life 
other than the solitude he desperately needs in order to be able to write: “I need a room 
and a vegetarian diet, almost nothing more.”2 These suffice for him to be literature: “I 
am nothing but literature and can and want to be nothing else.”3Yet he is asked to be 
other things as well. Foremost he is expected to be a Kafka man like his father Hermann 
Kafka: a full-grown, strong, authoritative man and also a husband, a father and a 
successful business man. Yet Franz is far from being a proper Kafka man. He is tied to 
life by another power, a power which is not very much compatible with the Kafka spirit 
of the family at all:  
   “Compare the two of us: I, to put it in a very much abbreviated form, a Löwy 
 with a certain Kafka component, which, however, is not set in motion by the 
 Kafka will to life, business, and conquest, but by a Löwyish spur that impels more 
 secretly, more diffidently, and in another direction, and which often fails to work 
 entirely. You, on the other hand, a true Kafka in strength, health, appetite, 
 loudness of voice, eloquence, self-satisfaction, worldly dominance, endurance, 
                                                           
1 Kafka, Franz. Franz Kafka: The Diaries of Franz Kafka 1910-1923. Ed. Max Brod. 
London: Vintage, 1999, p. 38 (entry from February 19, 1911) 
2 Ibid. p. 264 (from March 9, 1914)  
3 Ibid. p. 230 (from August 21, 1913) 
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 presence of mind, knowledge of human nature, a certain way of doing things on a 
 grand scale.”4 
 
That other direction is nothing other than literature and writing. Franz’s life is literature, 
and literature is his life.  One should take this sentence as literally as possible because 
literature, for Kafka, is a matter of life and death. Yet he cannot throw himself at 
literature entirely and exhaustively since he is pulled back by constraints of being a 
human being, a man, a Kafka son.  
Alvin Baum says Kafka “sees the world itself as a parable, an hermetic text in 
every passage of which is interwoven a complex matrix of signification.” 5  He is 
entangled in there. In fact taking a closer look at the literal meaning of the word parable 
would prove quite interesting. Charles Bernheimer underlines that the word derives 
from the Greek verb paraballein, meaning to compare. The verb is composed of the 
prefix para and the verb ballein which would literally translate as “a throwing to the 
side of…with the implication that this act, performed in order to compare, is somehow 
faulty and wrongful.”6 Could we not read this imperfect throwing as Kafka’s life par 
excellence? If we think of comparing as putting two parties side by side, then most part 
of Kafka’s life is made up of faulty and wrongful comparisons which are fated to fail 
because they try hopelessly to put side by side what are in fact incommensurable for 
him. In the middle of these faulty and wrongful comparisons, Kafka has to make room 
for air, and it is literature alone that gives him enough room to breathe:  
    “Cold and empty. I feel only too strongly the limits of my abilities, narrow 
 limits, doubtless, unless I am completely inspired. And I believe that even in the 
 grip of inspiration I am swept along only within these narrow limits, which 
 however, I  then no longer feel because I am being swept along. Nevertheless, 
 within these limits there is room to live, and for this reason I shall probably 
 exploit them to a  despicable degree.”7  
 
Only within these limits is there any room for Kafka to breathe, if he is to breathe at all. 
Although writing is too difficult and demanding a task for Kafka “which often fails to 
                                                           
4 Kafka, Franz Kafka Letter to his Father. Trans. by Ernst Kaiser and Eithne Wilkins, 
revised by Arthur S. Wensinger. Schocken Books Inc. Web. The URL: 
<http://www.kafka-franz.com/KAFKA-letter.htm> n. pag. 
5 Baum, Alwin L. “Parable as Paradox in Kafka’s Erzählungen” in ML+ 91:6 (1976). 
Rpt. as “Parable as Paradox in Kafka’s Stories”  in Modern Critical Views: Franz 
Kafka. ed. Harold Bloom. New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1986, p. 166 
6 Bernheimer, Charles. “Crossing over: Kafka’s Metatextual Parable” ML+ 95:5 (1980): 
p. 1264 
7 Kafka, Diaries, p. 313 (from August 30, 1914) 
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work  entirely”, as he says in the quote above from Letter to Father, it is still his only 
way to exist, to be: 
    “No one’s task was so difficult, so far as I know. One might say that it is not a 
 task at all, not even an impossible one, it is not even impossibility itself, it is 
 nothing. It is not even as much of a child as the hope of a barren woman. But 
 nevertheless it is the air I breathe, so long as I shall breathe at all.”8 
 
In Diaries he constantly refers to his writing as failure, yet it is this failure that keeps 
him alive. Writing is the only possibility of his existence; it is his way of being. Thus, 
how he writes is a perfect mirror of how he experiences the world, of how he lives. 
Experiencing the world as a parable, Kafka writes in parables. “Kafka’s writings are by 
their nature parables” 9 , says W. Benjamin; “he had a rare capacity for creating 
parables.”10 Breathing in the Kafkaesque world, he would produce Kafkaesque texts. 
Everything he writes, from diary entries to letters bear the mark of the nebulous-ness 
that beclouds his head. Deleuze emphasizes that “Style, in a great writer, is always a 
style of life too, not anything at all personal, but inventing a possibility of life, a way of 
existing.”11Exactly in that sense for Kafka writing is existence itself. His possibility of 
existence in the world could be brought about only through his becoming literature: 
“But I will write in spite of everything, absolutely; it is my struggle for self-
preservation.”12 He must write in order to exist in the physical sense, literally in flesh 
and blood. This is why writing is “an existential necessity” says David Constantine, 
“Kafka’s writing is existential.”13  
Let me first start with the passages of this complex matrix of signification which 
build up the parable, ─or in other words, the world─ entangled in which Kafka lives. 
After setting up the pieces, I will turn to the emergent picture itself, explore the 
conceptions of parable and analyze the unique and peculiar relationship Kafka bears to 
parable. Kafka’s text is “an event, not the record of an event.”14 His texts do not recount 
any event, it is rather the event, the anxiety itself, taking place, performing itself, in and 
                                                           
8 Kafka, Diaries, p. 402 (from January 21, 1922) 
9 Benjamin, Walter. Illuminations. Trans. Harry Zone. New York: Schocken Books, 
1969. p. 126 
10 Ibid, p. 124 
11 Deleuze, Gilles. Essays Critical and Clinical. Trans. Daniel W. Smith & Michael A. 
Greco. London: Verso, 1998. Intro. p. xv 
12 Kafka, Diaries, p. 300 (from July 31, 1914) 
13 Constantine, David. “Kafka’s Writing and Our Reading” in Cambridge Companion to 
Kafka. ed. Julian Preece. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. p.10 
14 Qtd. in Constantine, p. 19 
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through the text. “Kafka has no story to tell”, says David Grossvogel, “he conveys a 
mood, an anxiety ─his anxiety… he and his book are part of it.”15 Because Kafka’s 
writing is his life, and because his writing conserves and communicates the anxiety of 
his life, it is of critical importance to probe into Kafka’s life in order to better 
understand the dynamics of this anxiety.  
“My sense of guilt actually originates in you”16 says Kafka in his long letter to his 
father which never reaches its destination:  
   “[S]omething is wrong in our relationship and … you have played your part in 
 causing it to be so, but without its being your fault. … I'm not going to say, of 
 course, that I have become what I am only as a result of your influence. That 
 would be very much exaggerated (and I am indeed inclined to this 
 exaggeration). … As it is, all your educational measures hit the mark exactly. 
 …As I now am, I am (apart, of course, from the fundamentals and the influence of 
 life itself) the result of your upbringing and of  my obedience.”17  
 
Kafka’s world is the world of the father, the world of the name of the law; every inch of 
it is forever marked by the name of the father:  
    “Sometimes I imagine the map of the world spread out and you stretched 
 diagonally across it. And I feel as if I could consider living in only those regions 
 that either are not covered by you or are not within your reach. And, in keeping 
 with the conception I have of your magnitude, these are not many and not very 
 comforting regions.”18 
 
Is there really any safe region left? Does the name of the father spare any space? Maybe 
not safe and clean but there does stand a space which at least gives hope to Kafka, and 
grants him space to live. Undoubtedly it is literature. Although not totally divorced from 
the father, the space of literature enables Kafka to subvert and undermine the name of 
the father and the law. In fact what this study aims to examine is how Kafka fights back 
the invasion of the father, and of the law in and through literature. The very last entry 
Kafka writes to his diary reads as follows:  
    “More and more fearful as I write. It is understandable. Every word, twisted in 
 the hands of the spirits – this twist of the hand is their characteristic gesture – 
 becomes a spear turned against the speaker. …The only consolidation would be: it 
                                                           
15 Grossvogel, David I. “Kafka: Structure as Mystery” in Mystery and its Fictions: 
From Oedipus to Agatha Christie. Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 
1979. Rpt. as “The Trial: Structure as Mystery” in Modern Critical Views: Franz 
Kafka. ed. Harold Bloom. New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1986, p. 184 
16 Kafka, Letter to Father, n.pag. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
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 happens whether you like it or not. And what you like is of infinitesimallylittle 
 help. More than consolidation is: You too have weapons.”19 
  
Kafka writes the letter to his father during the last months of 1918 and early 
months of 1919. Yet, even leaving the world of the father, let alone exiling himself to 
regions which are at least not directly accessible to the father, would not help Kafka 
because he never really can leave it. In 1922 he writes this entry to his diary:  
    “[W]hy did I want to quit the world? Because ‘he’ would not let me live in it, in 
 his world. … I am now the citizen of this other world… though in this other world 
 as well- it is the paternal heritage I carry with me. … Is not Father’s power such 
 that nothing (not I, certainly) could have resisted his decree?”20 
 
A world covered by the father. The magnitude of the father is such that it barely leaves 
any space for his son to exist. The father, in other words, the absolute law giver, who 
himself is above the law, and thus not bound by it manages to cast his shadow on Kafka 
no matter how far away he might be. The feeling of guilt becomes part of his own self; 
thus wherever he goes he takes the father and the law with him.  
    “[F]or me as a child everything you called out to me was positively a heavenly 
 commandment, I never forgot it, it remained for me the most important means of 
 forming a judgment of the world, above all of forming a judgment of you 
 yourself… [Y]ou, so tremendously the authoritative man, did not keep the 
 commandments you imposed on me. Hence the world was for me divided into 
 three parts: one in which I, the slave, lived under laws that had been invented only 
 for me and which I could, I did not know why, never completely comply with; 
 then a second world, which was infinitely remote from mine, in which you lived, 
 concerned with government, with the issuing of orders and with the annoyance 
 about their not being obeyed; and finally a third world where everybody else lived 
 happily and free from orders and from having to obey. I was continually in 
 disgrace; either I obeyed your orders, and that was a disgrace, for they applied, 
 after all, only to me; or I was defiant, and that was a disgrace too, for how could I 
 presume to defy you; or I could not obey because I did not, for instance, have your 
 strength, your appetite, your skill, although you expected it of me as a matter of 
 course; this was the greatest disgrace of all.”21 
 
Law is neither one nor definite. It changes constantly, and is incalculable. What remain 
absolute and unchanging is the name of the law only, and the feeling of guilt ─which 
undoubtedly constitute the paternal heritage. Law renders it impossible for Franz to 
obey it: “I, the slave, lived under laws that had been invented only for me and which I 
                                                           
19Kafka, Diaries, p. 423 (from June 12, 1923) 
20 Ibid, p. 407 (from January 28, 1922) 
21 Kafka, Letter to Father, n.pag. 
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could, I did not know why, never completely comply with.”22 If he were able to know 
what is it that the law wants him to do or not to do, then he would act accordingly and 
that would be it. There would be no more concern for the law. Yet the law he is to obey 
is not known to him. What is known is only that he is to obey it. As it says in The 
Problem of Our Laws, “It is an extremely painful thing to be ruled by laws that one does 
not know.”23 It is also significant to note that the law to which he constantly fails to 
obey is the one that is created only for him and no one else. Franz is asked to achieve an 
impossible task; to obey the law which he does not know, which is founded on no stable 
ground and is thus incalculable. Accordingly, there is no logical pattern which would 
bring order and make anticipatory interpretation possible. What is more is that its 
content is hidden from him although he is commended to obey it. Law is the source of 
disgrace no matter how he acts. There is no possibility of escape from disgrace whether 
he obeys it or not.  
We could take the matter to an even greater extreme. Kafka mentions how 
Hermann Kafka reacts when he hears opinions or arguments that he does not favor. 
Then the law withdraws, abandons them: 
    “Then all one gets from you is: "Do whatever you like. So far as I'm concerned 
 you have a free hand. You're of age, I've no advice to give you," and all this with 
 that frightful, hoarse undertone of anger and utter condemnation.”24 
 
Despite seeming liberating, the law never lets him be liberated. Although freed, he is 
even more bound. Through abandoning, the law now applies even more forcefully. The 
disgrace does not disappear even when the law gives free license to do whatever he 
likes. Kafka’s status with respect to this remark resembles very much that of the man 
from the country with respect to the open door in the parable Before the Law. The law 
prescribes nothing, but he still cannot enter the open door. In prescribing nothing the 
law becomes pure ban, rendering any action impossible. In Homo Sacer, Agamben 
names this structure “the structure of sovereign ban” 25  where law becomes 
indistinguishable from life and applies in no longer applying. In the section “Form of 
                                                           
22 Kafka, Letter to Father, n.pag. 
23 Kafka, Franz. “The Problem of Our Laws” in The Complete Stories. New York: 
Schocken Books Inc., 1971.  Web. no pag. 
24 Kafka, Letter to Father, n.pag. 
25Agamben, Giorgio. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Trans. Daniel 
Heller-Roazen. California: Standford University Press, 1998. p. 49 
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Law” Agamben examines how law affirms itself by abandoning, in other words by not 
prescribing anything. “Nothing – and certainly not the refusal of the doorkeeper– 
prevents the man from the country from passing through the door of the Law if not the 
fact that this door is already open and that the Law prescribes nothing.”26 The free 
license of the father or the already openness of the door is that which makes any action 
impossible:   
    “Kafka’s legend presents the pure form in which law affirms itself with the 
 greatest force precisely at the point in which it no longer prescribes anything– 
 which is to say, as pure ban. … According to the schema of the sovereign 
 exception, law applies to him in no longer applying, and holds him in his ban in 
 abandoning him outside itself. The open door destined only for him includes him 
 in excluding him and excludes him in including him. And this is precisely the 
 summit and the root of every law.” 
 
Agamben explains that the structure of the sovereign ban corresponds to the structure of 
“a law that is in force but does not signify.”27 In similar fashion, the content of the law 
is not known to Kafka; he is thus Kafka is reduced to a state of ignorance which 
guarantees the feeling of guilt. It is the name of the law, not the content which rules – 
and rules absolutely. The absence of content enables the law to lay claim to very life 
itself: “[E]mpty potentiality of law is so much in force as to become indistinguishable 
from life.”28 Life becomes indistinguishable from law; Kafka from guilt, Josef K. from 
trial. Canceling the law would mean canceling one’s own self along with it. Their 
existences coincide:  
    “I picture the equality which would then arise between us—and which  you 
 would be able to understand better than any other form of equality— as so 
 beautiful because then I could be a free, grateful, guiltless, upright son, and  you 
 could be an untroubled untyrannical, sympathetic, contented father. But to this 
 end everything that ever happened would have to be undone, that is, we ourselves 
 should have to be canceled out.” 
 
Empty inside and indistinguishable from life, law becomes impossible to comply with 
because it becomes impossible to distinguish what is allowed and what is forbidden: 
“[I]n the state of exception, it is impossible to distinguish transgression of the law from 
execution of the law, such that what violates a rule and what conforms to it coincide 
without any remainder.”29 There is no possibility of knowing it before acting it out, in 
                                                           
26 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 49 
27 Ibid, p. 51 
28 Ibid, p. 53 
29 Ibid, p. 57 
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other words, only when it is too late. Furthermore law seems to be less concerned with 
the actions or facts than its own decision. As Josef K.’s uncle exclaims: “To have a trial 
like that means you’ve lost it”30once you are entangled in law, then you are already 
convicted, and that is why you draw law to yourself. The proceedings do not change 
you status as convict. As Titorelli explains, the actual acquittal is a probability which in 
fact does not exist.31 A similar exclamation arises from Letter to Father:  “One was … 
already punished before one even knew that one had done something bad.”32 
Agamben refers to a passage from Jean-Luc Nancy where Nancy delineates being 
abandoned by the law, which points to another critical aspect of the structure: 
“Abandonment does not constitute a subpoena to present oneself before this or that 
court of law. It is a compulsion to appear absolutely under the law, under the law as 
such and in its totality.”33 In other words it a process that continues as long as one is 
alive. Every moment, every piece of life, “[e]verything belongs to the court” in the most 
literal sense. 34And it is such a court that dwells in old, dirty and narrow attics and 
which can reach you any time anywhere. The trial is not over as long as one lives. The 
reverse also holds true, one lives as long as the trial continues. Life and existence end 
when the trial ends. Agamben emphasizes that “[I]nsofar as law is maintained as pure 
form in a state of virtual exception, it lets bare life subsist before it.”35 Law bestows life, 
just like “an undeserved gift”36 in Kafka’s own words:  
“It was … terrible when you ran around the table, shouting, grabbing at one, 
 obviously not really trying to grab, yet pretending to, and Mother (finally) had to 
 rescue one, as it seemed. Once again one had, so it seemed to the child, remained 
 alive through your mercy and bore one's life henceforth as an undeserved gift 
 from you.”37 
 
Life is in the hands of the law, and thus could be lost at any time without any advance 
indication because neither the content of the law could be known nor what course of 
action it will take the next moment. If Franz is still alive it is a gift which the father sees 
                                                           
30 Kafka, Franz. The Trial. Trans. Mike Mitchell. New York: Oxford University Press 
Inc., 2009. Web. p, 69 
31 Kafka, Franz. The Trial. Trans. Idris Parry. New York: Penguin Books, 1994. p. 118 
32 Kafka, Letter to Father, n.pag. 
33 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 58 
34 Kafka, Franz. The Trial. Trans. Idris Parry, p. 118 
35 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 55 
36 Kafka, Letter to Father, n.pag. 
37 Ibid. 
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fit for him. An undeserved gift though. There is another entry where Kafka talks about 
how he receives what the father gives him: “I could enjoy what you gave, but only in 
humiliation, weariness, weakness, and with a sense of guilt. That was why I could be 
grateful to you for everything only as a beggar is.”38 This is how Kafka sees his own 
existence in the world covered by the father. He lives at the mercy of the law.  
       “[I]f anyone has tried to calculate in advance how I, the slowly developing 
 child, and  you, the full-grown man, would behave toward one another, he could 
 have assumed that you would simply trample me underfoot so that nothing was 
 left of me. Well, that did not happen…But perhaps something worse 
 happened.”39 
In fact the magnitude of the father is not a figure of speech. The physical body 
and health is another critical aspect of the relationship of Kafka to the father. Both the 
diaries and also the letter include many statements describing the contrariness of the 
conditions of their bodies. Their features such as size and health come assume new 
signification and meaning. They are manifestations of their modes of existing in the 
world, and also existing in relation to each other: 
“[S]ince there was nothing at all I was certain of, since I needed to be provided at 
 every instant with a new confirmation of my existence, since nothing was in my 
 very own, undoubted, sole possession, determined unequivocally only by me—in 
 sober truth a disinherited son—naturally I became unsure even to the thing nearest 
 to me, my own body. I shot up, tall and lanky, without knowing what to do with 
 my lankiness, the burden was too heavy, the back became bent; I scarcely dared to 
 move, certainly not to exercise, I remained weakly.”40 
 
Kafka describes his life as hesitation, “My life is a hesitation before birth.”41  The 
hesitation of existing in the world of the father thanks to the undeserved gift from him, 
that hesitation manifests itself physically in Kafka’s body. It is as if his body takes the 
shape of the pain and guilt of being alive. In Letter to Father there is another very 
striking piece, a memory from childhood days which displays how the physical body is 
the symbol of power or powerlessness:  
    “I was…weighed down by your mere physical presence. I remember, for 
 instance, how we often undressed in the same bathing hut. There was I, skinny, 
 weakly, slight; you strong, tall, broad. Even inside the hut I felt a miserable 
 specimen, and what's more, not only in your eyes but in the eyes of the whole 
                                                           
38 Kafka, Letter to Father, n.pag. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Kafka, Diaries, p. 405 (from January 24, 1922) 
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 world, for you were for me the measure of all things. But then when we stepped 
 out of the bathing hut before the people, you holding me by my hand, a little 
 skeleton, unsteady, barefoot on the boards, frightened of the water, incapable of 
 copying your swimming strokes, which you, with the best of intentions, but 
 actually to my profound humiliation, kept on demonstrating, then I was frantic 
 with desperation and at such moments all my bad experiences in all areas, fitted 
 magnificently together. I felt best when you sometimes undressed first and I was 
 able to stay behind in the hut alone and put off the disgrace of showing myself in 
 public until at last you came to see what I was doing and drove me out of the hut. 
 I was grateful to you for not seeming to notice my anguish, and besides, I was 
 proud of my father's body. By the way, this difference between us remains much 
 the same to this very day.”42 
 
The body could be thought of as a means of affirming one’s existence. The weakness 
and fragility of Kafka’s body however makes his existence in the world even more 
difficult and tentative. How could he survive while he is only “a physical wreck”?43: 
    “It is certain that a major obstacle to my progress is my physical condition. 
 Nothing can be accomplished with such a body…My body is too long for its 
 weakness, it hasn’t the least bit of fat to engender a blessed warmth, to preserve 
 an inner fire, no fat on which the spirit could occasionally nourish itself beyond its 
 daily need without damage to the whole. How shall a weak heart that lately has 
 troubled me so often be able to pound the blood through all the length of these 
 legs? … Everything is pulled apart throughout the length of my body.”44 “[M]y 
 life … has progressed at most in the sense that decay progresses in a rotten 
 tooth.”45 
 
Kafka’s physical body could be thought of as a diary itself. It keeps the marks events 
make on his existence. The most drastic of such marks is the tuberculosis, with which 
Kafka is diagnosed in 1917. He describes the illness as the troubled relationship with 
Felice Bauer made manifest:  
    “If the infection in your lung is only a symbol, ... a symbol of he infection 
 whose inflammation is called F. and whose depth is its deep justification, if this is 
 so then the medical advice … is also a symbol.”46 
 
Kafka’s relationship with Felice B. lasts 5 years, from 1912 to 1917, which includes 
Kafka’s breakthrough and corresponds to the period in which Kafka produces his major 
works such as The Judgment, The Metamorphosis, America, In the Penal Colony, The 
Trial, Great Wall of China. Kafka’s two unsuccessful engagements to Felice B. prove 
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that marriage is an impossible task for Kafka. Its impossibility lies in the potential 
threats marriage pose to Kafka’s physical existence. There are two weapons of marriage 
which could literally kill Kafka. Diaries focus more on the possible lethal effects of 
marriage on Kafka’s writing. Since there is no life without writing for Kafka, any 
obstacle before writing is an obstacle before life. These entries are from the list he 
makes for his arguments against marrying:  
    “I must be alone a great deal. What I accomplish was only the result of being 
 alone. … I hate everything that does not relate to literature…. The fear of 
 connexion, of passing into the other. Then I’ll never be alone again….[T]he 
 person I am in the company of my sisters has been entirely different from the 
 person I am in the company of other people. Fearless, powerful, surprising, moved 
 as I otherwise am only when I write. If through the intermediation of my wife I 
 could be like that in the presence of everyone! But then would I not be at the 
 expense of my writing? Not that, not that!”47 
 
Marriage could cost Kafka his writing, which would mean his life. He describes his 
engagement saying, “Was tied hand and foot like a criminal. … And that was my 
engagement; everybody made an effort to bring me to life.”48 The only possible way for 
him to continue to exist in the world is literature. In order for him to write, he needs to 
be by himself. This is why bachelor life is the only chance of survival: “[I] nevertheless 
have the feeling that my monotonous, empty, mad bachelor’s life has some justification. 
I can once more carry on a conversation with myself, and don’t stare so into complete 
emptiness.”49 He writes this entry after he breaks his engagement to Felice B. It is as if 
he comes back to life only after the break up.  
The Letter to Father underlines one more way in which marriage could result in 
Kafka’s annihilation. Marrying means founding a family for oneself, becoming a 
husband and the head of the family. That also means becoming equal to the father. Yet, 
this equality is to bring no freedom but destruction to Kafka: 
“I would be your equal; all old and even new shame and tyranny would be mere 
history. It would be like a fairy tale, but precisely there lies the questionable 
element. It is too much; so much cannot be achieved….But to this end 
everything that ever happened would have to be undone, that is, we ourselves 
should have to be canceled out.”50 
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“[W]e being what we are, marrying is barred to me because it is your very own 
domain.”51 The domain of marriage is also the domain of the father: 
    “If I, in the particular unhappy relationship in which I stand to you, want to 
 become independent, I must do something that will have, if possible, no 
 connection with you at all; though marrying is the greatest thing of all and 
 provides the most honorable independence, it also stands at the same time in the 
 closest relation to you.”52 
 
In a paradoxical way what at first sight seems to be the surest way to independence 
turns out to be the path leading right into the heart of the danger. His trials of marrying 
end up only in failures because marriage turns into yet another web that entangles him 
in life. It draws him even more to the world of the father, whose “consequences are by 
no means unpredictable.”53In that sense women ─including the mother─ are allied with 
the father, trying to take him to a place where he cannot breathe. Seen from that 
perspective Felice resembles the women characters in The Trial who are on the side of 
the court. In Kafka: Toward A Minor Literature, Deleuze and Guattari underline the 
essential tie the women characters bear to the court, and draws attention to their 
functions in the novel. Fräulein Bürstner, Elsa, the washerwomen, Leni… “each is in 
‘contact’, in ‘connection’, in ‘contiguity’, with the essential-that is,.. with the trial, as 
ultimate powers of the continuous.”54 “[T]hey”, Deleuze and Guattari say, “bring about 
the deterritorialization of K by making territories, which each one marks in her own 
way, rapidly come into play.”55 They are “anticonjugal and antifamilial”56, and thus 
bring together “the qualities of sister, maid, and whore”, and “present an even more 
precise blend of things.”57 They stand at “the intersection of all the machines- familial, 
conjugal, bureaucratic”58 and they make them take flight. They disturb the equilibrium.  
Deleuze and Guattari emphasize that women are like the sounds of the footsteps of the 
court, declaring its appearance at hand. They lure Josef K. into the court. It is as if the 
initial move on the part of the court comes always with the appearance of women: 
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    “the opening of a segment that they belong to; they also mark its end… Thus 
 they function as a sort of signal that one approaches and moves away from. But, 
 above all else, each has precipitated her own series, her segment in a castle or 
 trial,  by eroticizing it; and the following segment will only begin or end, will only 
 be precipitated, through the action of another young woman.”59 
 
It is worth noting that the essential relationship between the women characters and the 
court resembles the relationship Kafka reads into their position vis-à-vis the father and 
marriage. They try to draw him nearer to the domain of the law. Thus their help is never 
really help but only deceit. 
Being equal to the father through marriage would require sexual intercourse too, 
so that he too can become a father himself. But this physical side of marriage is yet 
another torment for Kafka. Sex is a source of repulsion and disgust; it is filthy: “Coitus 
as punishment of being together. Live as ascetically as possible, more ascetically than a 
bachelor, that is the only possible way for me to endure marriage.”60 The source of the 
filth of sexual intercourse is also to be found in Kafka’s view of the father. The father 
has the enjoyment of married life without any shame or guilt, while he advises Kafka to 
visit brothels. This advice of his disappoints Kafka deeply. In Letter to Father he says if 
the world is divided between the father and Kafka himself, and it is the father who gets 
to have the clean and pleasurable part; then what remains for Kafka ─the other wicked 
part─ is only the filth:  
    “[W]hat you advised me to do was in your opinion and even more in my opinion 
 at that time, the filthiest thing possible. … The important thing was rather that you 
 yourself remained outside your own advice, a married man, a pure man, above 
 such things; this was probably intensified for me at the time by the fact that even 
 marriage seemed to me shameless; and hence it was impossible for me to apply to 
 my parents the general information I had picked up about marriage. Thus you 
 became still purer, rose still higher. So there was hardly any smudge of earthly 
 filth on you at all…. if the world consisted only of me and you (a notion I was 
 much inclined to have), then this purity of the world came to an end with you and, 
 by virtue of your advice, the filth began with me.”61 
 
Another indispensable piece of Kafka’s world is undoubtedly his identity as a 
Jewish Czech of Prague who speaks German, and also his Jewish roots and his stance 
on Judaism. I will focus more on the Jewish tradition in the last chapter when discussing 
the significance of parables in religions, particularly Judaism, and its implications for 
Kafka’s writing in parables. Before going into the issue of the German language let us 
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start with language itself. In Letter to Father Kafka tells why he falls silent, and prefers 
not to speak in the world of the father:  
   “The impossibility of getting on calmly together had one more result, actually a 
 very natural one: I lost the capacity to talk. I dare say I would not have become a 
 very eloquent person in any case, but I would, after all, have acquired the usual 
 fluency of human language. But at a very early stage you forbade me to speak. 
 Your threat, "Not a word of contradiction!" and the raised hand that accompanied 
 it have been with me ever since. What I got from you—and you are, whenever it 
 is a matter of your own affairs, an excellent talker—was a hesitant, stammering 
 mode of speech, and even that was still too much for you, and finally I kept silent, 
 at first perhaps out of defiance, and then because I could neither think nor speak in 
 your presence. And because you were the person who really brought me up, this 
 has had its repercussions throughout my life.”62 
 
When we consider “[t]he terrible uncertainty of [his] inner existence” 63  and the 
weakness of his physical body, it is as if his voice has also taken the shape that best fits 
to Franz’s existence. From head to toe he is under the incalculable and irrational law 
which could take the gift of life from him even at the least expected minute. Even 
talking is not allowed lest it would express unfavorable opinions. In fact, whether it is 
really possible for him to speak any opinion that would not be unfavorable is a quite 
legitimate question. His stammering is only another indication of his hesitation in the 
face of existence, like his illnesses. The fundamental cause is the inability to be, to exert 
or affirm himself in the world of the father, which has repercussions throughout his life. 
Here is another piece, this time from the Diaries, where Kafka speaks of not being able 
to speak because he lacks the solidity to complete a sentence:  
    “The difficulties … I have in speaking to people arise from the fact that my 
 thinking, or rather the content of my consciousness, is entirely nebulous … 
 conversation with people demands pointedness, solidity, and sustained coherence, 
 qualities not to be found in me.  No one will want to lie in the clouds of mist with 
 me, and even if someone did, I couldn’t expel the mist from my head; when two 
 people come together it dissolves of itself and is nothing.”64 
 
Kafka’s diary entries are full of reproaches and complaints about not being able to write 
─to write better, or to write at all. The nebulous-ness beclouding his mind and body 
manifests itself in writing as well as speaking, and it has a lot to do with the German 
language as well. In a letter to Max Brod, Kafka emphasizes “the impossibility of not 
writing, the impossibility of writing in German, the impossibility of writing 
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otherwise.”65 Kafka writes in his diary that he is not able to love his mother enough 
simply because of the German language:  
    “Yestarday it ouccured to me that I did not always love my mother as she 
 deserved and as I could, only because the German language prevented it. The 
 Jewish mother is no‘Mutter’, to call her ‘Mutter’ makes her a little comic. …We 
 give a Jewish woman the name of a German  mother, but forget the contradiction 
 that sinks into the emotions so much the more heavily, ‘Mutter’ is peculiarly
 German for the Jew, it unconsciously contains, together with Christian splendour 
 Christian coldness also, the Jewish women who is called ‘Mutter’ therefore 
 becomes not only comic but strange. Mama would be a better name if only one 
 didn’t imagine ‘Mutter’ behind it. I believe that that is only the memories of the 
 ghetto that still preserve the Jewish family, for the word ‘Vater’ too is far from 
 meaning the Jewish father.”66 
Deleuze and Guattari argue that Kafka invents his way of surviving in the German 
language. The hesitant and stuttering Kafka now makes language ─not the German 
language but language in its entirety─ stutter. Putting the German language of Prague in 
perpetual disequilibrium, Kafka makes language take flight and “tremble from head to 
toe.”67 This is nothing other than minorization of the German language. What Kafka 
does with German of Prague, Deleuze explains, is to “invent a minor use of the major 
language within which [he] express[es] [himself] entirely; [he] minorize[s] this 
language, much as in music, where the minor mode refers to dynamic combinations in 
perpetual disequilibrium.”68   This minor use of language produces “words [which] 
create silence.”69 “It is as if the language were stretched along an abstract and infinitely 
varied line” says Deleuze, and adds, “[t]his exceeds the possibilities of speech and 
attains the power of… language in its entirety.” 70 This is how Kafka speaks in a foreign 
language; “he carves out a nonpreexistent foreign language within his own language.”71 
“Anyone who cannot come to terms with his life while he is alive” says Kafka in a diary 
entry from 1921: 
    “needs one hand to ward off a little his despair over his fate – he has little 
 success in this – but with his other hand he can note down what he sees among the 
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 ruins, for he sees different (and more) things than do the others; after all, dead as 
 he is in his own life time, he is the real survivor.”72  
It is this other hand, the dead hand, which writes that sets language into perpetual 
disequilibrium. Kafka’s language is the language of a stuttering existence.  
I argue that Kafka’s use of parable is one way that Kafka adopts in order to make 
language tremble. Parable is a text that suspends itself at the limit of language and thus 
makes it possible to “examine the space between language and that which is beyond 
language.”73 Kafka’s text is a text that constantly undermines itself, and as such it is a 
text that “never arrives.” 74  Charles Bernheimer claims that Kafka’s text has a 
“metatextual structure [which] undoes the concept of parable advanced within the text 
itself”, and concludes that Kafka’s text is “a parable of metatextuality.”75It defies itself, 
and any interpretation while leaving out no way but to interpret. In abrahamic religions, 
and especially in Judaism, for which oral tradition is exceptionally important in the 
transmission of religious truths, parable has a unique place. Situated in the middle of 
“the gap between the literal and the figurative”, parable forces its reader to go beyond 
the literal, “to move from the echo of truth to the very source of truth.”76  It has 
traditionally been used as a vehicle through which truth is made accessible and 
graspable to its readers. However with Kafka, parable is subverted. It does not enlighten 
any more, but only darkens. It does not bring truth closer but only marks its remoteness 
and inaccessibility, underlining again and again the gap hanging between truth and the 
reader. Seeing the world as a parable, Kafka could not better express his “horrible 
double life”77 but through the parable, the arch-double. 
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CHAPTER 1.  READING THE PARABLE: 
JOSEF K. BECOMING THE READER 
 
 
 
 
‘+o,’ said the priest, ‘one does not have to believe 
everything is true, one only has to believe that it is 
necessary’. ‘Depressing thought,’ K said. ‘It makes the lie 
fundamental to world order.’ 
                    Kafka, The Trial 
 
Words fluctuate in Kafka. They are never safe, neither is the reader. Each word is 
a parable in itself. Kafka’s contempt for metaphor is well-known. Yet, even the literal 
cannot be literal enough, for words cannot be that which they signify. Words are 
doomed to fail to meet the demand Kafka makes of them, “the demand that truthful 
speech be the direct emanation of being.”78 Thus the abyss of meaning opens and Kafka 
appears as the trapeze artist, not unlike the one in First Sorrow, living on the thin rope 
that hangs above this abyss. This critical rope is made up of words only, and it acts as 
the fragile line that separates life from death. The Trial is a masterpiece of such decisive 
words. What lies at the heart of The Trial is but a question of words. What do they 
                                                           
78 Sokel, Walter H. “Language and Truth in the Two Worlds of Kafka” The German 
Quarterly Vol. 52, No.3 (May, 1979), p. 371. 
 
 
18 
 
mean? How do they acquire their meaning? Josef K. is unable to comprehend what is 
happening to/around him precisely because for Josef K. and also for us as readers, there 
is always a gap between what is being said and what Josef K. and we see happening: 
   “Who is speaking to us about these things? Can’t he see that the world he is 
 looking at doesn’t make sense? He seems to be part of it and yet apart from it; he 
 tries ever so thoughtfully to work it out, and so presumably has a point of 
 reference outside it──that is what the logic of his as of all language 
 implies──and yet he never succeeds. Indeed, his thoughtful narration is the world 
 he is failing to make sense of. And it is this that lends to Kafka’s narrations their 
 nightmare character. For a nightmare too engulfs us, leaving us no independence 
 of view or action, no possibility of escape or control. We cannot separate 
 ourselves from it: that is the nightmare, as we recognize on waking and half feel 
 while we are in its grip.”79  
This, Anthony Thorlby suggests, is how Kafka takes the nightmare to the farthest limit, 
forces it to become apparent, and discloses that “language engulfs itself and the 
world.”80 “[B]y blurring the distinctions we are used to: between thoughts and things, 
between literal and metaphorical usage, between the speaker’s view and what he is 
speaking about”81, Kafka “expose[s] the illusoriness of the interpretive, metaphorical 
activity itself, into which language leads us in vain pursuit of truth”, and challenges 
Josef K. and the reader who are still under “the troubling illusion of there being a world 
to explain”82The Trial is the ax for the world of whose existence language has been 
persuading us : 
   “I believe that we should read only books that bite and sting us. We need books 
 which affect us like a very painful calamity…like being cast into forests far from 
 all human beings, like suicide; a book must be an ax for the frozen sea inside us. 
 That I believe.”83 
Language bridges the gap between the inexplicable corporeality and human thought by 
“cover[ing] existence with a familiar and comprehensible surface”84, that is, meaning. 
In and through meaning, language makes the world appear as solid, stable, rational and 
logical. Yet, “[b]eneath this exterior, there lay for Kafka magnitudes of infinitely vast 
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and unspeakably dangerous.”85 This is why reading Kafka is lethal, always a question of 
life and death.  
The famous opening sentence of The Trial is thus quite significant. The first 
sentence is our first step; and our first step is a paradox, harbinger of what is yet to 
come not only for Josef K. but also for us, the readers of Josef K. and Kafka. First of all, 
the sentence is a weird combination of one assumption and two statements: “Somebody 
must have made a false accusation against Josef K., for he was arrested one morning 
without having done anything wrong.”86 The first part of the sentence suggests only a 
possibility, be it strong or weak. Somebody may or may not have slandered Josef K. 
However the way things stand, it makes more sense to assume that somebody actually 
did, because Josef K. got arrested. The lethal logic manifests itself in this very first 
sentence. Already we, the readers, are searching for the missing causes to explain the 
evident facts (or effects) even before Josef K. himself. And moreover, it soon becomes 
apparent that what we and Josef K. turn to is the same: to make assumptions. The 
second part of the sentence does not make a suggestion but states a fact, “he was 
arrested.”87 But the sentence is not over yet, here is the drastic phrase: “without having 
done anything wrong.”88 This part too is presented as a fact, not as an assumption: He 
has not done anything wrong. Thus this addition leaves no room for the possibility of 
Josef K.’s guilt. What we have in our hands is nothing more than Josef K.’s innocence, 
his arrest and the assumption that something must be wrong; the connection between 
these two conditions ─his innocence and his arrest─ must be a mis-connection because 
these two facts are mutually exclusive and contradictory. The only way the two can stay 
together in a meaningful way is with the intervention of the assumption that there is 
something wrong; that there must be an accusation made against Josef K., and that the 
accusation must be false. However, an assumption by definition points to a substitution, 
to a lack, to something missing in the chain of cause and effect. Fragile and tentative as 
it is, the assumption is essential, indispensable and even critical if this sentence is to 
make any sense. We are perfectly aware that an assumption may or may not correspond 
to the real case, and that the possibility that an assumption may in fact be wrong does 
not eliminate it from the scene. In fact it might prove quite illuminating to take a look at 
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the definition of the word in dictionaries. McMillan Online Dictionary includes two 
entries for the word assumption. The first definition is as follows, “something that you 
consider likely to be true even though no one has told you directly or even though you 
have no proof.”89 The word directly calls for further attention here. Assumption misses 
the immediacy, the un-mediatedness of the event; it comes either before or after the 
event. It relates to the event only delicately and tentatively. Such vagueness is the 
defining feature of assumption, and Sokel argues, also of Kafka: 
   “Kafka’s vocabulary is one of inference and conjecture. Favorite words are 
 ‘apparently’, ‘ostensibly’, ‘maybe’, ‘actually’. Kafka prefers ‘it seems’ to ‘it is’. 
 His sentences often consist of two clauses: the first states a fact or a guess; the 
 second qualifies, questions, negates it. The conjunction ‘but’ is, therefore, most 
 characteristic of Kafka’s thought structure. …Kafka favors the subjunctive. The 
 only bridge between the protagonist and his environment is surmise.”90  
Assumption is not defined by its truth or falsehood; rather it is defined by its probability 
to have been/to be the case only so far as it can account for this particular state-of-
affairs. Could the situation at hand be explained if things were assumed to have 
happened this way? The missing link that we want to re-establish is not the link that ties 
the assumption to the real world so to say, but the link that ties the end result to the 
cause. We are not interested in whether the assumption is or ever was a real possibility, 
we only want to know whether it would explain the situation at hand. Therefore Kafka’s 
use of subjunctive form is critical; the subjunctive intrinsically makes assumptions. 
Sokel refers to Aristotle’s Poetics, and explains that the subjunctive form in Kafka “acts 
as the grammatical correlative of a structural device called anagnorisis.”91 Anagnorisis 
is the Greek word for recognition, or discovery. We may think of it, Sokel says, as “the 
hero’s surprise at the unexpected turns of events.” 92  I would like to extend this 
definition, and suggest thinking of it in terms of the hero’s coming to know, or his 
recognition that he had been making false assumptions up until then. However, there is 
a vital difference between the kind of recognition in the classical Greek tragedies and in 
The Trial. Aristotle defines recognition in Poetics as “a change from ignorance to 
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knowledge.” 93  In the Ancient Greek tragedies anagnorisis is really a leap from 
ignorance to knowledge of the truth both for the hero and for the audience. Both parties 
get to know the true state-of-affairs. Yet in Kafka, anagnorisis leads only to untruth. As 
a matter of fact, Josef K.’s assumptions always turn out to be false. They always point 
towards what is not truth. Therefore in The Trial, recognition does not disclose any truth 
either for Josef K. or for the reader. In fact it only prolongs Josef K.’s and readers’ 
ignorance by proving to them that once again they have missed the truth, rather than 
show the truth that they have been missing. Sokel argues that in Kafka, anagnorisis 
only “reveal[s] the discrepancy between the protagonist’s consciousness and the truth 
underlying the story.”94 What we miss here is the link to the real world on the level of 
assumption. We and Josef K. discover only that Josef K. has perceived the world in a 
wrong way; that the world is not like what Josef K. thinks it is. We do not ever know 
how the world really is. We only know how Josef K. conceives of it, and that he always 
misconceives it. The real world is suspended in order to attach reason / cause / meaning 
to the self-evident facts.  
There is more. The first sentence makes an impossible demand from the reader. It 
requires of the reader to deal with the two contradictory things at once: both that Josef 
K. has not done anything wrong, and that he is under arrest. We can either believe the 
narrator, or suspend our judgment till more information is presented. But this either/or 
is inclusive; it is not an exclusive one. After all, “[c]orrect understanding of a matter and 
misunderstanding of the same matter do not exclude each other entirely.”95 Thus, we 
must follow two paths at once so that we can continue reading. “The premise in the 
paradox”, says Constantine “is worth insisting on. It ought to prepare us for the paradox 
in the work and deter us from saying things must be this or that. They are more likely, 
in Kafka, to be this and that, in contradiction.”96 On the one hand the reader might 
partly side with the narrator and tentatively believe Josef K.’s innocence, on the other 
hand s/he is still on the watch, assuming that the narrator may or may not be telling the 
truth. The reader acts like Josef K., and searches for clues that either support or 
undermine the sentences s/he is faced with. S/he has already taken the step into the 
                                                           
93 Aristotle. Poetics. Book XI. Trans. S.H. Butcher. N/A: Orange Street Press, 1998. 
p.22 
94 Sokel, Franz Kafka, p.11 
95 Kafka, The Trial, Trans. Idris Parry, p.169 
96 Constantine, p.13 
 
 
22 
 
world of infinite assumptions. What if the narrator is telling the truth, and what if it is 
not? If the reader could determine which way to go, that would relieve him/her of a 
great burden: the burden to calculate and keep all possibilities in mind at equal validity, 
just like Josef K.. Making a choice would eliminate the other possibilities, and thus 
would make the reader’s job much easier. Then s/he would know how to judge each 
word, and know what it means. Yet, the reader is not allowed to make any choices. 
After a short while this question concerning the truth of the narrator’s words becomes 
irrelevant, just like the truth of the court or Josef K.’s guilt. Hailed by the words, the 
reader abandons the search for the truth behind the words and instead his/her gaze shifts 
to fall on words themselves. The reader must act as if s/he had made a choice, and 
chose, all at once, each and every possibility of meaning which those words might 
entail. We never know if our assumptions as to the meanings of the words are true or 
false; yet we have to make those assumptions because making assumption is our only 
possibility to make way for our reading. We must assume that such it must be 
corresponds to such it is.  We must assume that this is truth while we are most ignorant 
of truth. Forcibly we must be transformed into liars and thus, into readers. We do not 
have to believe that assumptions are true; we only have to believe they are necessary.  
The Trial opens with Josef K. opening his eyes, and the first chapter covers the 
whole day from waking up to going bed. When Josef K. wakes up in the morning of the 
arrest day and sees the warders around him, what immediately comes to his mind is that 
this whole thing must be a mise-en-scène, a theatrical play, a make-believe; “One could 
of course regard the whole affair as a joke, a crude joke…This was of course possible, 
perhaps all he had to do was laugh in some way in the warders’ faces and they would 
laugh with him.”97 This whole situation would only make sense to Josef K. if it were a 
joke. Then it would mean that this state-of-affairs was not in fact the real case, and that 
the real meaning of this whole situation lay beyond what is seen. Maybe his colleagues 
at the bank had prepared him this crude joke for his thirtieth birthday. That could be one 
possibility. Yet, when he speaks to the warders it becomes less and less probable that it 
really is a joke. However, neither Josef K. nor are we, as readers, totally sure that it is 
not a joke. We wait with Josef K., suspending our judgment. We too want answers. He 
talks to the warders; it is of no use. Speaking with them does not change much for Josef 
K.’s comprehension of the situation. In fact it complicates it even more; his unanswered 
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questions give birth to more questions. There is no communication or dialogue that 
builds up with the exchange of words, which could calm Josef K. at least to some 
degree. Some dialogue could clarify the situation and give an account of it, maybe even 
confirm that this is not an everyday situation, and that he is right to be perplexed. Such 
an approach would still not answer all of Josef K.’s questions surely, but it would at 
least re-affirm that they understand each other and that there is no gap between what the 
one says and what the other understands from what is said. Josef K. would feel less lost, 
and more in control. However, it soon turns out that there is always an unbridgeable gap 
between what the warders say and what Josef K. understands and vice versa:  
   ‘Who are you?’ asked K., stating up in his bed. But the man ignored the 
question, as if his appearance were to be accepted without query, and merely said: 
‘You rang?’ ‘Anna is supposed to be bringing me my breakfast,’ and then he tried 
to determine through silent observation and reflection who the man really was. … 
‘He wants Anna to bring him his breakfast.’ This was followed by a short burst of 
laughter in the next room.”98 
Josef K. wakes up to see these weird looking strangers in his bed room. His daily 
routine is disturbed, and now all of a sudden his usual call for breakfast has turned into 
something different and unfamiliar. It is ridiculed by the warders as if in an effort to 
translate Josef K.’s words so that they correspond to the correct meanings. When Josef 
K.’s words come to mean what the warders assume them to mean, they become only 
laughable. The way Josef K. cannot make himself heard properly is very much like the 
squealing of the metamorphosed Gregor: “[the] squealing which allowed his words to 
remain articulate literally for only a moment, then stifled them so much as they died 
away that you couldn’t tell if you’d heard them properly.”99 The two protagonists’ trials 
to speak and make themselves heard ─but heard properly─ are thus essentially not very 
unlike. This very first scene of the novel already hints at the abyss which opens between 
what the warders’ mean and what Josef K understands. 
Then follows a second scene which leads Josef K. to end his futile trials to speak 
to the warders, and accept that the two parties do not hear each other properly, for some 
curious reason:           
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   “‘…you can’t make him understand anything,’ said the other [warder]. K. made 
no further answer; do I, he thought, have to let myself be even more confused by 
the twaddle of these lowest instruments…? ‘Anyway, they are talking about 
things they do not understand at all. … A few words with someone on my own 
level will make things incomparable clearer than the longest conversation with 
these two.’”100 
Josef K. is still hopeful that he may be properly heard. When he finally meets the 
supervisor, to whom he thought he could finally express himself and be understood, the 
same spell still appears to be in the air. Josef K. begins his attempts to make sense of the 
happenings once again. He takes up from where he had stopped: 
“‘I’m not going to say I regard the whole thing as a joke; the arrangements that 
have been made seem too extensive for that. All the people in the boarding-house 
would have to be involved, and all of you too. That would take it beyond the limits 
of a joke. So I’m not going to say it’s a joke.’ …’But on the other hand,’ K. went 
on, … the matter can’t be very important either. I deduce this from the fact that 
I’m accused of something but can’t find the slightest guilt to justify an 
accusation.’”101 
Now he decides that it cannot be a joke, as he had earlier supposed, and cites his 
reasons, and reasons behind those reasons. “You are making a great mistake” answers 
the supervisor: “I am absolutely unable to tell you that you stand accused, or rather I 
don’t know if you are. You are under arrest, that’s true, I don’t know more than that.”102 
Josef K. answers with only one sentence: “But it’s senseless.”103 Thus fails Josef K.’s 
second trial to read the situation correctly.  
   “‘You are under arrest, that’s all. That’s what I had to communicate to you, I’ve 
done that, and I’ve also seen how you’ve taken it… [W]e can take leave of each 
other… I suppose you’ll want to go to the bank now?’ ‘To the bank?’ asked K. ‘I 
thought I was under arrest.’…So he said again: ‘How can I go to the bank? I am 
under arrest.’ ‘Ah yes,’ said the supervisor, ... ‘You have misunderstood me. It’s 
true you are under arrest, but that doesn’t mean you can’t follow your occupation. 
And you won’t be hampered in your normal way of life.’”104   
What does being under arrest mean then? Why does Josef K. not already know what it 
entails? Why can Josef K. not take the meaning of being under arrest for granted? Why 
is what the word means not already self-evident to him? Josef K. has to re-define the 
meaning of being under arrest so that it can correspond to the kind of arrest that the 
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supervisor is talking about. He cannot ever take the meaning of any word for granted; he 
always has to find the correct meaning on his own. With this new definition of the word, 
he now comes to think “[b]eing arrested is not so bad.”105 Although Josef K. corrects 
and adjusts his language for this time to the language of the warders and the supervisor, 
he continues naturally to think in his own usual way, and shortly after realizes that this 
new definition still does not make much sense to him either: “But then it seems it was 
not even very necessary to tell me about my arrest.”106 “It was my duty answers the 
supervisor.”107 “‘A stupid duty,’ say[s] Josef K. unrelentingly.”108 It is not that different 
than being totally free. If it will not prevent him from living exactly the same way than 
what is the meaning of being under arrest?  
“It is a shared language, a dialogue, that seems to guarantee a graspable world, a 
stable cosmos” says Walter H. Sokel, and continues, “[t]his language has to be spoken in 
such a way ‘as if everyone would (and could) expect it.’”109 Josef K.’s cosmos is never 
stable, because meaning is never stable for Josef K. He is different than the court people 
who always anticipate the language. For them, there is never any gap between what is 
said and what is meant. Josef K., however, cannot command the language which would 
put things in place and assure that they stay where they belong. Here Sokel refers to a 
scene in Description of a Struggle where the child is amazed at how the two women can 
understand each other in such a smooth, uncomplicated and almost natural way:  
   “I heard … [m]y mother…ask someone downstairs, in a natural tone: ‘What are 
 you doing, my dear? It’s so hot.’ A woman answered from the garden: I am 
 having high tea in the green [garden].’ They said that without reflecting and 
 without undue distinctness, as if everyone would have to expect it.”110   
That is exactly what Josef K. lacks, the ability to always already anticipate the language.  
Josef K. never knows what he is expected to have known. No statement is ever crystal 
clear to him. He always misunderstands and is always misunderstood. Yet he is 
persistently expected to have known the language. It becomes easier to see why Josef K. 
always and without any exception misses the correct or the intended meanings once we 
take into account that being in language, in the crudest sense, may mean having agreed 
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to the correct or intended meanings of words. To put it differently, truth does not reside 
in the word itself. The truth of the true meaning of the word does not originate in the 
world or in the word. “It is the presence of the ‘trace’ of that community which makes 
the names of things ‘truthful.’”111 It emerges only from out of relations that are always 
already set by the community. Words are truthful only because and to the extent that the 
community agrees to assume that they all mean the same thing when they utter this 
particular word. Because “the world receives meaning literally from the consensus of the 
community which bestows the ‘truthful’ names on things”, the meaning/the true 
meaning of that particular word is such and such only, and not otherwise.112 Without 
being a member of such a community of a language, one is left with no choice but to try 
to calculate the true meaning of the words, only to see that his trials are doomed to fail, 
and that he is never to hit the correct meaning. This is why Josef K.’s words are 
[properly] heard by no ear. If you are not already a member of the community of 
speakers of a language, then you have to calculate and remember; you cannot know and 
act immediately. You have to wait before the door of language infinitely if you are not 
already in it. Entry already means you are outside, and thus, for you, there is no 
possibility of entering. It echoes the scientist that Benjamin refers to in Some Reflections 
on Kafka, standing on the threshold of a door, unable to pass through it due to his 
calculations of probabilities whereas the simple man, for whom such concerns or 
calculations do not exist, passes through the door as naturally as those women in the 
Description of a Struggle enjoy their dialogue. Just like the country man of Before the 
Law, the scientist waits and waits while “[h]e should consent … and walk in rather than 
wait till all the difficulties involved in…are resolved.”113 
As we soon see, Josef K. strives to manage this gap between his language and the 
language of the new world and the new community which the Court has introduced into 
his life. He constantly tries to bridge the gap. Not owning the words of this alien 
language, Josef K. is forced to invent his own words that are supposed to correspond to 
the unknown meanings of the unknown words of this new language. He has to make 
substitutions. One such example is when he recounts the morning’s events to Ms. 
Bürstner in order to apologize to her for disturbing her privacy: 
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   “‘But I have explained to you, Fräulein,’ said K., … ‘that it was not I who 
interfered with your photographs; but since you don’t believe me I shall have to 
confess the investigating commission brought three bank employees here, and one 
of them…probably handled the photographs.’ ‘Yes, there was an investigating 
commission here,’ added K., since the Fräulein looked at him inquiringly. …’But 
no, Fräulein,’ said K., ‘this is no joke. Why can’t you believe me? I have told you 
everything I know. Indeed, more than I know, because it wasn’t an investigating 
commission at all; I’m giving it that name because I  don’t know what else to call 
it. Nothing was investigated. I was only put under arrest, but by a commission.’”114  
Josef K. has to choose from among countless possibilities what those words that fly in 
the air in fact mean. A word might mean anything! And he is to be held responsible for 
his choices of meanings, which always turn out to be wrong. The reason why he has to 
choose is because only he sees multiple and different possibilities of meanings while for 
others it is always clear, and is to be taken for granted. Others understand the correct or 
intended meaning right away, naturally, without any hesitation, just like the women in 
Description of a Struggle. There is no other possibility of meaning for them, unlike 
Josef K. He is the one, in fact the only one, who always misses the correct meaning of 
words, always makes wrong choices as to what was in fact meant. We soon come to see 
that Josef K. is very much defined by this peculiarity.   
 
 
 
a. Reading: The Silent Yes at the Eye of the Storm 
 
 
    But what answers the call of literary reading is not a door 
     falling open or becoming transparent or even getting a bit 
     thinner. It is, rather, a ruder stone, better sealed, a  
     crushing weight, an immense avalanche that causes the 
     earth and sky to shudder. 
                     Maurice Blanchot, The Space of Literature 
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Josef K. is faced with meaningless events, meaningless in the sense that Josef K. 
does not understand what is happening. He tries to, but he cannot comprehend the 
events taking place around him. Moreover he is unable to follow the explanations which 
he reaches here and there and which are supposed to render the happenings meaningful 
─at least to some degree─. But explanations do not explain anything, nor are they 
themselves any different than the events that they are supposed to account for. This is 
how Josef K. is surrounded by two layers of meaninglessness: what happens to him, or 
the events themselves on the one hand; and the alien language within which these 
meaningless happenings make sense, on the other. His own words fail to correspond to 
the new world he has just been introduced. Yet, he is faced with these brute facts 
anyhow. Meaningless as they may be, they stand right before him. Josef K. reacts to this 
meaninglessness in two ways, which could be thought of as the two faces of the same 
coin: He makes assumptions as to the possible explanations of the events, and then he 
refutes those which do not seem to be in line with the most up-to-date state-of affairs. 
And he makes assumptions as to meanings of the foreign words, and makes up his own 
words so that he can talk about those mysterious happenings. The most crucial element 
in both of these reactions is that they originate in him. The source of the made-up words 
or the assumptions is him, and him only. To put it differently, it is Josef K. himself who 
creates all those hypothetical causes and effects; all reasons behind his justifications and 
refutations; and finally, all his made up words and meanings which only make the lack 
of the correct meaning or language more and more apparent rather than make up for it. 
It is as if Josef K. acts out the Prometheus parable (written in January 1918): 
    “Prometheus 
 There are four legends concerning Prometheus: 
 According to the first he was clamped to a rock in the Caucasus for betraying 
 the secrets of the gods to men, and the gods sent eagles to feed on his liver,  
 which was perpetually renewed. 
 According to the second Prometheus, goaded by the pain of the tearing beaks, 
 pressed himself deeper and deeper into the rock until he became one with it. 
 According to the third his treachery was forgotten in the course of thousands of 
 years, forgotten by the gods, the eagles, forgotten by himself. 
 According to the fourth everyone grew weary of the meaningless affair. The  gods 
 grew weary, the eagles grew weary, the wound closed wearily. 
 There remained the inexplicable mass of rock. The legend tried to explain the 
 inexplicable. As it came out of a substratum of truth it had in turn to end in the 
 inexplicable.”
115
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This extraordinary parable brings reading and writing together in the face of the 
meaningless mass of rock. The meaninglessness of the crude corporeality is part of what 
invites the trial to understand this very meaninglessness, to metamorphose it into 
something meaningful by creating a story for it in and through which it may make 
sense. Walter H. Sokel argues that the myth is the end product of the act of reading. 
“Here”, continues Sokel, “the desire to narrate forms a continuum with the need to 
understand──that is, to read.”116 “[W]riting itself… becomes the search for significance 
that makes it a kind of reading. Writing and reading become interchangeable, a circular 
continuum, without a break between them.”117 Four different legends, four different 
readings before the inexplicable rock: 
    “It is the wish to read meaning into enigmatic givenness that begets the myth.  
 In terms of the parable, ‘writing’ is inseparable from reading. Together they form  
 the attempt to understand what is simply there ─the strangely shaped mountain 
 range. The telling of tales is presented as an attempt to produce meaning.”118 
 
 The parable marks that the inexplicable mass of rock remains inexplicable and 
enchanting as ever, calling for new legends. As long as it stands there, it will invite and 
welcome those eyes that see it; and the eyes which see it, will always try to read it and 
understand it; and each reading will be a mis-reading, and each understanding a mis-
understanding. Here the invitation of the mass of rock resembles the song of the Sirens, 
alluring and captivating. In Kafka’s Silence of the Sirens Odysseus escapes the Sirens 
by not seeing them, “all … faded from his sight as he fixed his gaze on the distance, the 
Sirens literally vanished before his resolution, and at the very moment when they were 
nearest to him he knew of them no longer.”119 He shifts his gaze to beyond them; he 
does not look at them; he does not see them. Thus when they were closest to him, they 
no longer existed for him, nor did their song or silence. Yet, reading is the exact 
opposite. It is to look at the Sirens straight in the eye, welcome their song, and welcome 
the enchantment. And this is precisely what Josef K. does; he becomes a reader, and 
thus, an artist. 
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“Reading”, says Maurice Blanchot, “…welcomes, consents, says yes” to that call 
of the Sirens so to say.120 The call that comes from the work itself which exists only 
after its call is received. For Josef K. the call comes from the court. However, it is 
crucial to underline that the call does not enjoy an independent and autonomous 
existence, rather, its existence is essentially tied to its being heard and received: 
“Doubtless there is a sort of call, but it can only come from the work itself. It is a silent 
call…which only reaches the reader’s ear because he answers it.”121  And it is this 
welcoming of the call which “lifts the work to being.”122 Blanchot’s account of the 
relationship between literary reading and the rising of work (from death) ─”Lazare, 
Veni Foras”─ proves very illuminating when think of the relationship between Josef K. 
and the court. As a matter of fact, there seems to be a great parallel between the way 
reading lets the work be, and the way Josef K. lets the court be. This constitutes the core 
reason why I argue that Josef K. is a reader, that he reads the court. The call only 
reaches the reader’s ear because he welcomes it, he answers it. This silent call has the 
strangest way of being. It both exists and does not exist before it is properly heard/ 
answered/ received. Its existence coincides with its receipt. Reading is nothing but to 
hear and answer this call. Blanchot continues, saying, “This call turns him away from 
ordinary relations and toward the space in whose proximity the reading, by abiding 
there, becomes the approach to the work [the court] and …[a] welcome to the work’s 
[the court’s] generosity…. The reading is this abiding.”123 One of the earliest examples 
of such welcoming of the call is when the supervisor notifies Josef K. of his arrest. Here 
we read a strange remark from the supervisor: “That’s what I had to communicate to 
you, I’ve done that, and I’ve also seen how you’ve taken it”, says the supervisor when 
he tells Josef K. that he is under arrest.124 And he waits to see how Josef K. reacts to the 
call speaking through him: will he take it or not? Josef K. takes it, and says yes to the 
call of the court. The supervisor sees his abiding. Only after seeing that Josef K. 
receives the call is his mission completed, “That was my duty.”125  
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Yet, the earliest example is undoubtedly the opening scene of the book, when 
Josef K. wakes up from his sleep into a new world:  
   “The cook…who brought him his breakfast every morning at eight o’clock did 
 not come this time. That had never happened before. K. waited for a while and 
 with his head on the pillow looked at the old lady who was observing him with a 
 curiosity quite unusual for her, but then,…he rang the bell. Instantly there was a 
 knock at the door and a man he had never before seen in the house came in.”126 
 
The hush before the storm is in the air. Things are different than usual on that morning. 
The old lady most probably sees the warders, who will soon enough arrest Josef K., and 
whom Josef K. has not seen yet. Already she becomes transformed into something 
different in the world of the court, she now acts in an unusual way. We do not know 
whether the warders have just arrived at the house, or whether they have been there for 
some time, waiting for Josef K. to ring the bell. Yet, to assume that they have been 
waiting for a sign from Josef K. makes a curious reading which would also resonate 
with the immediacy of the knock at the door, and the appearance of the warders inside 
Josef K.’s bedroom. It is as if Josef K. has given the sign and they have taken it, and 
answer back. In a paradoxical way resembling that of the call which comes in to being 
only when it is heard (but in order to be heard it first has to exist), the court both already 
exists, and does not yet exist. Josef K. is both already on trial, and is not yet on trial. 
This is how and why these two gestures clash: “‘Who are you?’ asked K., starting to sit 
up in bed. But the man ignored the question, as if his appearance were to be accepted 
without query.”127 
It is indeed quite significant that the novel opens with the waking up of Josef K.. 
It is as if Josef K. wakes up into the world of the court when he opens his eyes. 
Blanchot likens reading to stepping into another world: 
   “[t]here is in reading…something vertiginous that resembles the movement by 
 which, going against reason, we want to open onto life eyes already closed. This 
 movement is linked to desire which, like inspiration, is a leap: I want to read 
 what is, however, not written [yet].”128 
 
The Trial opens with this leap, Josef K.’s leap into the world of reading, his leap into 
becoming a reader. Josef K. wakes up as a different man than before. He has just woken 
up into a different world. It is as if he says I want to read what is not written yet [the 
court]. He listens to the song of the warders and accepts to be enchanted by it. He 
                                                           
126 Kafka, The Trial, Trans. Idris Parry, p. 1 
127 Ibid. 
128 Blanchot, The Space of Literature, p. 195 
 
 
32 
 
participates in that enchantment. In a fashion similar to the Prometheus parable, he 
reads the inexplicable and thus, writes his own legend. Reading, so argues Blanchot, “is 
a violent rupture: the passage from the world where everything has more or less 
meaning, where there is obscurity and clarity, into a space where, properly speaking, 
nothing has meaning yet.”129 Reading, Blanchot says: 
   “demands of the reader that he enter a zone where he can scarcely breathe and 
 where the ground slips out from under his feet—and even if, leaving aside these 
 stormy approaches, reading still seems to be participation in that open violence, 
 the work [the trial]—nonetheless, in itself it is tranquil and silent presence, the 
 calm center of measureless excess, the silent yes at the eye of every storm.”130  
 
It is as if Blanchot is rewriting Josef K.’s description of the empty assembly halls where 
the air is hardly breathable and where the windows open only to soot as opposed to 
fresh air:  
   “K. was too exhausted… He stood up shakily… could not stand upright. … [H]e 
 felt as if he were seasick. He thought he was on a ship plunging through heavy 
 seas. It seemed to him as if water were surging against the wooden walls, a roar 
 coming from the depths of the corridor like water flooding over, the corridor 
 rocking sideways and the waiting clients falling and rising on either side.”131 
 
Kafka writes the first chapter and the last chapter of The Trial in 1914, and 
continues to work on the novel throughout 1915. From 1916, after The Trial, we have 
an interesting short story, A Dream, barely more than a page. The protagonist is our 
Josef K. The text opens with the sentence “Josef K. was dreaming.”132Here is the 
dream: Josef K. feels like taking a walk on a beautiful day. He hardly takes a few steps 
than he finds himself at the cemetery. He has seen “a freshly heaped grave mound 
which he wanted to pause beside.”133 While the grave mould was rising and falling in 
his vision he makes a sudden leap and falls right before the grave mould. Two men 
stand behind the grave, holding a gravestone. They place the gravestone when Josef K. 
reaches there. All of a sudden there appears a third man, an artist, who holds a pencil in 
his hand and draws figures in the air while coming towards Josef K. The artist writes the 
words HERE LIES on the gravestone, and looks at Josef K.. He tries to continue to 
write on the gravestone, but he cannot continue. He once again looks at Josef K. 
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“[T]hey exchange helpless glances.”134 And then starts the bell of the chapel nearby. 
“K. felt miserable because of the artist’ predicament, he began to cry.”135 With great 
reluctance the artist engraves the letter J. “At long last K. understood him;…with all his 
fingers he dug into the earth…a great hole opened out…into which K. sank, wafted onto 
his back by a gentle current. And while he was already being received into the 
impenetrable depths” he sees his own name engraved on the gravestone.136 “Enchanted 
by the sight, he woke up.”137 Can we not think of this short piece as the true first chapter 
of The Trial, which opens with the scene when Josef K. has just woken up, and is still in 
the bed? This dream may be the dream that Josef K. was dreaming while he was asleep. 
We are justified to assume that he has dreamt his own death in that dream from which 
he has just woken up in The Trial, and only after having died his own death and having 
survived it does he become his own reader (and thus writer). This is important, because 
the call and the court, in other words reading begins right here. The violent rupture takes 
place in the dream. “[G]oing against reason”, Josef K. begins to read only after this 
dream. 138 Because he reads he becomes an artist.  
We are not given much information about how the artist looks other than his 
pencil in his hand and cloths. We do know, however, that Josef K. and the artist look at 
each other, although Josef K., being too curious about the rest of the letters, “paid 
hardly any attention to the man” at first.139 I suggest reading the artist as ‘Josef K. the 
Reader’, or as ‘Josef K. the Artist’, who reads, could add a lot to The Trial. The living 
Josef K. may have failed to recognize this new Josef K., who is an artist, because Josef 
K. the Artist is very different from him. Josef K. the Artist looks at the world quite 
differently, in fact so differently that the old Josef K. cannot even recognize himself or 
his own eyes. It is as if the one Josef K. who belongs to the world, enjoys the day, takes 
a walk, in other words who lives in the world has to be buried so that the artist Josef K. 
who is “clad only in trousers and a badly buttoned shirt; on his head was a velvet cap”, 
draws figures in the air ─who, in short, does not seem to belong in the word as much as 
the other Josef K.─ could be/ exist.140 When we think of this dream in terms of the birth 
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of Josef K. the Reader, or the artist, then the opening scene of The Trial becomes much 
more telling. Already before the novel begins Josef K. has become an artist. He has 
heard the call and has began to read. Thus, when he opened his eyes on the day of the 
arrest into the world of the warders and the court, he had already stepped into the world 
of the court. “[G]oing against reason”, he had already left his other self buried in the 
grave, and had taken the leap into the world of reading.141 Then he began to read, and 
thus write what was not yet written. He read, and thus wrote his legend just as in the 
Prometheus story. In a way, it is as if through reading, he becomes part of his own 
legend which he reads, and thus writes, and also lives. His metaphorical death in the 
dream marks this transformation he undergoes through reading; he is metamorphosed 
into language, and now belongs to another world than the world of the living.  
 
 
 
b. Entangled in the Text  
 
 
 And it came to pass after these things, that God did tempt 
Abraham, and said unto him, Abraham: and he said, 
Behold here I am.      
              Genesis 22:1 
 
               “Even if I’ve come late, I am here now”  
                                                    
                                     Josef K. 
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“Jemand mußte Josef K. verleumdet haben, denn ohne daß er etwas Böses getan 
hätte, wurde er eines Morgens verhaftet.”142 In his book Franz Kafka, W. H. Sokel 
underlines that “the German word for the arrest, Verhaftung, carries the additional 
meaning of entanglement and fatal attachment.”143 It is as if all of a sudden Josef K. 
somehow gets entangled in the court, just like a fly stuck in a fly-paper. It fact the image 
of fly comes from the text itself. While Josef K is being carried by the two executioners 
by the arms, we read these words: “He was reminded of flies wrenching their legs off in 
the struggle to free themselves from fly-paper.”144 Without any doubt the most striking 
scene where Josef K. flies right into the court is when Josef K. answers the call of the 
priest when he is summoned by name by the priest in the cathedral. Sabine I. Gölz 
describes this scene as the perfect manifestation of Althusser’s interpellation. Here Gölz 
puts emphasis on Josef K.’s turning his head around to look at the priest who addresses 
him by his name, and likens Josef K.’s turning to the physically turning around which 
Althusser mentions in his theory of interpellation and subjecthood:  
   “I shall then suggest that ideology ‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in such a way that it 
‘recruits’ subjects from among the individuals, or ‘transforms’ the individuals into 
subjects by that very precise operation which I have called interpellation or 
hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace 
police hailing: ‘Hey, you there!’ Assuming that the theoretical scene I have 
imagined takes place in the street, the hailed individual will turn around. By this 
mere one-hundred-and- eighty-degree physical conversion he becomes a subject. 
Why? Because he has recognized that the hail was ‘really’ addressed to him, and 
that ‘it was really him who was hailed’ (and not someone else).”145  
 
The word is recognition. The individual hears the call and simultaneously he recognizes 
that the call is for him. Taking the call upon him, the individual is now transformed into 
something different. He now enjoys a new kind of being or existence. His bodily move 
declares that he hears the call, and confirms that it is him and him only, who is called. 
Throughout The Trial Josef K.’s case is exactly like what Althusser describes here. In 
fact, in the novel Josef K. is not hailed only once. He is not hailed, for example, in such 
a way that the interpellation occurs once and for all, and absorbs him forever. Rather 
Josef K. is called quite more than once, for example he is called by the warders and the 
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supervisor, and he is called by the phone for the first session, and he is called when he is 
watching theatre etc. Josef K. responds to these calls, and he responds each time by 
taking a further step into the world of the court. This scene in the cathedral, where he 
turns his head to the direction of the call of the priest, who also belongs to the court as 
he soon reveals, is in some way more peculiar than the others. Here we have unusual 
descriptions of Josef K.’s stream of thought:  
   “He had almost left the pew area and was approaching the open space between 
 this and the entrance doors when he heard the priest’s voice for the first time. A 
 powerful, practiced voice. How it pierced the expectant cathedral! But it was not 
 directed at a congregation. It was unambiguous and there was no escape; he was 
 calling: ‘Josef K.!’ K. stopped abruptly and stared at the floor. For the time being 
 he was still free, he could walk on and make his way from there through one of 
 the three small dark wooden doors not far in front. That would show he had not 
 understood, or that he had indeed understood but was taking no notice. But if he 
 turned round he was caught, for then he was admitting he understood very well, 
 that he was really the person called for, and that he would comply. If the priest 
 had called out again, K. would certainly have walked on but, as everything 
 remained quiet all the time he waited, he turned his head slightly to see what the 
 priest was doing now. He [the priest] was standing motionless in the pulpit as 
 before, but it was obvious he had noticed the movement of K.’s head.”146 
 
These words call for more attention: For the time being he was still free, but if he turned 
round he was caught. The narrator seems to know what Althusser is talking about 
already. The narrator invites the reader to think that Josef K. is calculating whether or 
not he should or would recognize that the call is indeed for him. As for Josef K. himself, 
we do not know what he really thinks, or whether he is aware that he will be caught if 
he turns round. It is as if the narrator is translating for the reader what Josef K.’s actions 
─whether he is ignorant or aware of them─ mean in the language of the court. In that 
language if he hears the call, and responds to it, the call becomes meant for him. This 
relationship between Josef K. and the call again resembles the relationship between the 
inexplicable mass of rock and the legends of Prometheus. Josef K. sees the court, and 
there the court is.  
However, the scene gets even stranger when the priest, whose call was 
unambiguous, asks Josef K., “Are you Josef K.?” as if in order to confirm that his call 
was ambiguous, and he would not recognize that it was Josef K. if Josef K. had chosen 
to simply walk away, refusing the call. Such a question from the priest does not go hand 
in hand with the precision of the court. After all, the priest is part of the court. The 
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priest, and therefore the court, and also the call may not be aiming Josef K. that directly 
and personally. Josef K. answers, saying “Yes,” to the priest’s question.147 Immediately 
after Josef K.’s yes comes the priest’s sentence, “You are accused,”; “Yes,” K. answers 
again. “Then you are the one I am seeking.” 148  Only after these questions and 
confirmation does the priest unite the call and Josef K. 
Another similar scene is when Josef K. goes to the first session of the trial. 
Although until then everything seems to have been arranged for Josef K. in a very 
personal and careful way, here a drastic void opens. The examining magistrate does not 
recognize Josef K.: “‘Right,’ said the examining magistrate, who was leafing through 
the book and now turned to K. with the air of making an assessment: ‘You are an 
interior decorator?’”149  Without any doubt, what follows this mis-recognition is as 
bizarre as the cathedral scene. Josef K. explains that he is not an interior decorator but 
an administrator at a bank, and after this clarification, he goes on, saying: 
   “Your question, sir, as to whether I am an interior decorator ─ or rather, you 
 didn’t ask, you told me so outright ─ typifies the whole nature of these 
 proceedings instituted against me. You may object that these are not proceedings 
 at all. You are absolutely right, for they are only proceedings if I recognize them 
 as such. But I do recognize them for now, for the moment anyway, out of pity, so 
 to speak.”150 
 
This answer of Josef K. cries out loudly that he already knows that he is reading, that he 
has heard the call and thus given life to it, and by doing that, given life to the trial. Josef 
K. already knows everything, yet, against reason as Blanchot had beautifully put it, 
becomes his reader anyhow. Knowing that the proceedings might end once he does not 
recognize them does not change much for Josef K. He continues to recognize them as 
proceedings still, and participates “in that open violence”, as Blanchot puts it ─which, 
as I will soon discuss, is very much the trial of any reader of The Trial.151 
Judith Butler in her article “Conscience Doth Make Subjects of Us All” explains 
that this turning round that Althusser explains is more than a physical response to a call 
that wants you to turn round only. Rather this gesture is the assurance that the call has 
been heard properly, and that the hailing is complete. This is why it is significant to 
note that the narrator makes sure that we understand that the priest recognizes that Josef 
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K. has turned his head to look at him: “He [the priest] was standing motionless in the 
pulpit as before, but it was obvious he had noticed the movement of K.’s head.”152 If we 
go back to the very first pages of the novel when Josef K. sees the warders in his 
bedroom, and learns that he is under arrest; the supervisor who comes to Josef K.’s 
room to notify him of his arrest utters very alike sentences: “You are under arrest, that’s 
all. That’s what I had to communicate to you, I’ve done that, and I’ve also seen how 
you’ve taken it.”153 This gesture, Butler claims, does not emerge independently of its 
hearer, which is very much in line with how recognizing the inexplicable, seeing it as 
such, breathes life into it and begets the legends, just as in the Prometheus parable. 
   “The one who turns around in response to the call does not respond to a demand 
 to turn around. The turning around is an act that is, as it were, conditioned both by 
 the "voice" of the law and by the responsiveness of the one hailed by the law. The 
 "turning around" is a strange sort of middle-ground (taking place, per- haps, in a 
 strange sort of "middle-voice") that is determined both by the law and the 
 addressee, but by neither unilaterally nor exhaustively. Although there would be 
 no turning around without first having been hailed, neither would there be a 
 turning around without some readiness to turn.”154 
 
What Butler emphasizes here echoes Blanchot’s remark that the call “only reaches the 
reader’s ear because he answers it.”155 It is not only the call that is alluring; the ear is 
already allured so that it can hear the song of the Sirens. Neither the call nor the ear can 
unilaterally or exhaustively account for the enchantment which emerges out of their 
unification. They must find each other first, or else there will not be any call or any 
Josef K. to hear the call.  
Recognizing his trial as a trial, Josef K. opens the door of a different world. After 
stepping through the threshold of this door, things metamorphose into very different 
things. He gets entangled in language. Antony Thorlby argues that Josef K. is guilty 
only of “bad grammar”, “mislead by language”; adds that, “[h]is basic mistake is a tiny, 
prepositional one.” 156  “Prepositions”, he explains, “are the smallest words which 
establish the most fundamental relationships: in this case, the relationship of these 
supposed things to K.─ that is, what he is guilty ‘of’, and what his trial is ‘about’.”157 
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Thorlby argues that fundamentally Josef K. is “misled by the way he thinks about it [the 
trial].”158 He analyzes the German words of the original text and explains that Josef K. 
transforms the words into different words, and “alter[s] the narrative” as the priest 
protests.159 “The nouns ‘law’ and ‘court’” he explains, “sound as if they refer to real 
things; but these apparent substantives are (in German anyway) abstract concepts 
formed from verbs.”160 Yet, Josef K. takes them literally, as if they do designate an 
independently existing entity. On hearing the call of reading and responding to it, Josef 
K. transforms a process, which only means that “something is going on in K.’s life, as 
in all of us, which may make it ‘a trial’; but it does not follow that this trial is a legal 
one.”161 It is Josef K. thanks to whom Der Prozeß, or a process becomes the trial. It is 
such small words that entangles him in language; transforming a process into his trial. 
He makes assumptions and these assumptions turn into reality soon after. Without any 
doubt the most essential word of the novel is law. Even this foundational word is not 
stable enough. In fact it is this very word that lies at the core of The Trial’s ambiguity. 
Gesetz points at making assumptions. The word for law in German, Gesetz, “carries 
overtones that suggest something is only being ‘assumed’.”162 “But take an assumption 
literally, as real, and it acquires the solidity of what is ‘laid down’─of what is the case, 
of law, in fact.”163 Yet, taking the assumptions literally is the only way, for both Josef 
K., Kafka and us, the readers, to make way for our reading. “Thus,” Thorlby continues, 
“Kafka describes K.’s case, indeed his whole story, with a word that means perhaps no 
more than that something is going on: namely, a Prozeß, a process.”164 But when Josef 
K. says Der Prozeß, it is no more an ordinary process in any one’s life. This process 
now means his trial. He assumes that “his life constitutes a case, and his case a trial, that 
he is being tried for something, by somebody, and according to some code of law.”165 
His only mistake is this. Being called to read, Josef K. assumes and thus, writes his own 
trial.  
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But what if Josef K. did not become an artist who, going against reason, wants to 
read? What if Josef K. acted precisely like Kafka’s Odysseus in Silence of the Sirens, 
and became deaf to the enchanting call of reading? We may deduce that the 
meaninglessness of the mass of rock, or Josef K.’s trial may not be if and when there 
were no eyes that see it to be lacking meaning. In other words the whole process might 
have ended without even starting if Josef K. had not been a reader. To claim that the 
trial would definitely turn nonexistent if Josef K. were deaf to the call, and simply 
ignored the whole process would be too clear-cut, which would not be very much in line 
with the general structure of the work. Such an argument would at least have to require 
that we assume in a persistent manner that in the next chapter Josef K. would not find 
himself entangled once again by the court. Such an assurance, however, is not to be 
found easily ─if at all─ in Kafka texts anyhow. Even though it would be too daring to 
argue that the trial would definitely end if Josef K. could avert his gaze when he was 
exposed to the trial, the possibility that the whole process may actually end, still stands 
as a quite powerful and significant alternative. Against all odds, we still have enough 
clues which hint at this possibility, and we must not disregard this new alternative way 
of seeing things. Just like the complications of passing through a door exist only for the 
scientist and not for the simple man, the inexplicable may indeed be/exist only for the 
eye which sees it, and thus gives it being.  
Let me now turn to the fragment from The Trial titled “To Elsa”, which Kafka 
decides not to include in the novel. It is a lethal fragment, a “radical rupture from the 
‘trial’”. It offers an alternative for Josef K. ─not only for Josef K. but also for the reader 
as well, which I will soon explore deeper─, an alternative that would end all his trouble, 
and thus put an end to the novel. What if Josef K. did not hear the call of the court? 
What if he were simply deaf to this enchanting call? What if he refused der Prozeß 
altogether? What if Josef K. refused to be entangled by the process? The decision traced 
in the fragment “To Elsa” would not only lead Josef K. away from the court; but, 
having done so, it would also lead “the writing process away…from the very possibility 
of the novel with that title”; it “would have amounted to abandoning the writing of that 
novel altogether”, so argues Sabine I. Gölz.166 If “To Elsa” were included in the novel, 
it might be the end of The Trial. In the Elsa fragment Josef K. is called by telephone “to 
appear immediately at the law court offices”, but he chooses to make plans of going to 
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the bar to see Elsa in the evening.167 Josef K. asks what if he were not to come, and the 
voice on the phone answers, “We’ll know how to find you”:168  
    “And will I be punished for failing to come of my own free will?” asked 
 K. and smiled in anticipation of what he would hear. “No,” was the reply. 
 “Splendid,” said K., “but then what possible reason do I have to comply with 
 today's summons?” … He drove directly to Elsa without delay. Leaning back 
 comfortably in the corner of the cab… He meditated with a certain satisfaction 
 on the fact that if the court was truly in session, he was causing it no small 
 difficulty. He hadn't said clearly whether or not he would appear in court; thus 
 the judge was waiting, perhaps the entire assembly was waiting; K. alone would 
 fail to appear, to the particular disappointment of the gallery. Unperturbed by the 
 court, he was heading exactly where he wanted to go. For a moment he couldn't 
 be sure that he hadn't absentmindedly given the driver the court's address, so he 
 called out Elsa's address loudly to him; the driver nodded, he had been given no 
 other. From then on K. gradually forgot about the court, and thoughts of the  bank 
 began to occupy him fully once more, as in earlier times.169 
 
This what if is crucial because it opens up a new possibility for Josef K. With asking the 
question what if he has created the possibility of not hearing the call. And then he even 
confirms that he will not be punished for refusing to be hailed. After all when one of the 
two essential parts is missing, then the enchantment of the call cannot exist as Butler 
explains. We must have both the call which reaches the reader’s ear only because he 
answers it, and also the reader who is already enchanted enough to hear the call at the 
same time. If the reader no longer hears the call, then the call cannot exist, because its 
life is dependent on being heard. When the call does not exist, there cannot be any 
punishment since the absence of the call might be thought of as being equal to the 
absence of the court. After creating the alternative of not going to the court, or, to echo 
Josef K.’s own words from the first session, deciding not to recognize the court as such, 
Josef K. is now unperturbed by the court. He goes directly to Elsa, and while in the taxi 
he leans back comfortably: “From then on” K. gradually forgot about the court, and 
thoughts of the bank began to occupy him fully once more, as in earlier times.170 Once 
exorcising the court, Josef K. slowly returns to his old way of life. He forgets the call of 
the court, and the trial and all the proceedings; instead his usual worries as to his work 
replace them. From then on, Josef K. ceases to read. He goes back being the Josef K. 
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who has not died in A Dream. He goes back to being the living ─as opposed to 
reading─ Josef K. once again. 
Butler draws attention to the immediacy that the call demands, and says:  
   “The one addressed is compelled to turn toward the law prior to any possibility 
 of asking a set of critical questions: Who is speaking? Why should I turn 
 around? Why should I accept the terms by which I am hailed?”171 
 
Once this compulsion is broken by the question what if then the call becomes paralyzed, 
the whole process gets disturbed. “[B]ut then what possible reason do I have to comply 
with today's summons?”172 After this question the whole chain breaks loose, and the 
court disappears gradually from K.’s mind. 
Even a further step for Josef K. would be to ask what if the call and the trial is not 
for him. In other words, what if the call is not intended for him but somebody else, i.e 
an interior decorator for whom the examining magistrate mistakes Josef K. for? What if 
he is not the addressee? Could the call of the trial be fake? In other words, what if the 
call does not originate from the court, but only from Josef K. himself? Is it only Josef 
K.’s illusion that the trial is calling him? After all the priest warns him, saying, “You are 
deceiving yourself about the court”, and explains the illusion enveloping the court: “In 
the introductory writings to the law, that deception is presented in this way”, and so he 
begins to tell the story of the doorkeeper to Josef K. [italics mine].173 The priest’s 
remarks as to the deceit concerning the court are like the final and the most explicit 
warning Josef K. could receive. Heinz Politzer in his book Franz Kafka: Parable and 
Paradox underlines that the priest tells Josef K. the story of the doorkeeper “to prove to 
K. that he is deluding himself about the Court. …Since K. is told the story so that he 
may learn through it the delusion under which he is laboring with regard to his Trial.”174 
It is as if the priest is correcting Josef K., and telling straightforwardly that there is no 
call, and that he is deceiving himself about the court: “...I belong to the court,’ said the 
priest, ‘so why should I want anything of you? The court asks nothing of you. It 
receives you when you come and it releases you when you go.”175 Despite such candid 
remarks Josef K. does not break the illusion. 
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Kafka’s parable titled Abraham could prove very illuminating here. The parable 
presents another Abraham who hesitates before the call. This two-and-a-half-page 
parable tells the story of an Abraham who, unlike the Abraham who is the father of 
faith, cannot ever be sure that it is him who is called. “I could conceive of another 
Abraham for myself” 176, says Kafka, and so he conceives:  
   “[T]ake another Abraham. One who wanted to perform the sacrifice altogether 
 in the right way… but could not believe that he was the one meant, he, an ugly 
 old man, and the dirty youngster that was his child. True faith is not lacking to 
 him, he has this faith; he would make the sacrifice in the right spirit if only he 
 could believe he was the one meant. He is afraid that after starting out as Abraham 
 with his son he would change on the way into Don Quixote.”177 
 
Kafka’s Abraham puts quotation marks around the call, and questions for whom it is 
meant. For this Abraham there is the possibility that the call, although it is he who hears 
it, could be meant for somebody other than himself. Kafka’s Abraham is afraid that he 
might be deluding himself that it is he who is called: “He is afraid that after starting out 
as Abraham with his son he would change on the way into Don Quixote.”178  The 
mentioning of Don Quixote makes it impossible not to refer to another Kafka parable 
here, The Truth About Sancho Panza: 
   “Sancho Panza succeeded in the course of years, by feeding him a great number 
 of romances of chivalry and adventure in the evening and night hours, in so 
 diverting from himself his demon, whom he later called Don Quixote, that this 
 demon thereupon set out, uninhibited, on the maddest exploits.”179 
 
Don Quixote is Sancho Panza’s demon whom Sancho Panza is striving to avoid by 
telling stories which sets him off from one adventure to another. Abraham is afraid that 
he might be doing exactly what Sancho Panza is doing, that is, he might be setting 
himself on an adventure by thinking that the call is calling him. From another point of 
view this is also precisely what the priest warns Josef K. about: he might be deceiving 
himself, and believing that he is being called when the court does not want anything of 
him. What if the call were not for him, and he was only being Sancho Panza? Just like 
Josef K., who asks what if he did not show up in the court office in To Elsa chapter, 
Kafka’s Abraham asks a very similar question: What if the call is not meant to call me. 
Yet, Josef K. never asks this question; rather he makes the leap of assumption. He 
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assumes that the court is calling him in spite of many occurrences or remarks which all 
say one and the same thing: He is deluding himself about being called by the court. If he 
could not make assumptions but instead be stuck with the question what if the court is 
not calling him, his end would probably be like Kafka’s Abraham whose waiting for the 
answer to the question whether it is he who is being called would sentence him to 
lifelong hesitation before the call, not very unlike the waiting of the countryman before 
the door of the law. However, Josef K. does not get stuck with such possibilities. 
Although he does mention that he may not be the one who was meant to be arrested, he 
does not really consider this possibility: “[P]erhaps the order had been given to arrest 
some interior decorator who is just as innocent as I, but they came for me.”180 It is as if 
Josef K. says “Behold, here I am”, but as “an Abraham who…come[s] 
unsummoned!”181 When he comes the court only takes him in, just like the priest says. 
“There is no room for mistake”, just like the warders underline when they arrest Josef 
K., because Josef K. and gets entangled in the court himself by acting on his 
assumptions.182 “Our authorities”, says one of the warders, “do not go in search of guilt 
in the population but are, as it says in the law, drawn to guilt…This is law.”183 We could 
translate the warder’s words in the following way: The only law is to receive those who 
come and release them when they go. What matters is not truth of the call or the court, 
but Josef K.’s own assumptions as to their truth. While Kafka’s Abraham cannot act but 
becomes paralyzed by the possibility that he is not the addressee of the call, no such 
possibility occurs to Josef K. He assumes that there is a court, that he is on trial, and that 
the law is calling him. Therefore, what the law does is only to receive him. 
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CHAPTER 2.  READING THE TRIAL: 
THE READER UNDER ARREST 
 
 
   
 
[I]t is not so much we who read Kafka’s words, it is they 
 who read us. And find us blank.       
                        George Steiner, +o Passion Spent 
 
So far I have argued that Josef K., having died and being born again as a reader, 
hears the call of the court, welcomes it and thus lets his trial be. In other words, the 
court or the trial does not lead an autonomous life, independent of Josef K.’s answer. I 
have tried to sketch how Josef K. responds to the call of his trial, and trace what could 
happen if he responded differently. Now I would like to take a further step, and explore 
how the reader of Josef K. responds when s/he finds him/herself before The Trial. In 
this chapter, I will focus on the experience of reading The Trial. I will argue that as long 
as the reader reads The Trial, The Trial receives him/her just like the law receives Josef 
K. when he comes. Although Josef K. does acknowledge that he may not be the one 
intended by the court, he still assumes the role or the responsibility to face the law even 
if he says he is speaking only for those who may find themselves in the same situation 
as himself, “I speak here for those, not for myself.”184 Once Josef K. gets entangled in 
─in other words, arrested by─ the court he reads his trial into a Prozeß. Josef K. does 
not really pay attention to the possibility that it may not be his trial; rather he always 
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assumes that it is, and he acts on his assumptions. Unlike Kafka’s Abraham who is 
paralyzed by the thought what if the call does not call him even if he is the one who 
hears it, Josef K. passes over this possibility with an affirmative assumption and flies 
into the next level thanks to the wings this assumption provides. In fact Kafka’s 
Abraham and the man from the country in the parable Before the Law act in the same 
way. Both of them are waiting for the answer to their question. The Abraham parable 
reads, “he would make the sacrifice in the right spirit if only he could believe he was the 
one meant.”185 We could translate the sentence in the following way: Abraham would 
act once his question what if it is not him, get its answer. We can also deduce from the 
parable that if the question what if had not occurred to Abraham, again he would have 
acted. Once the question appears, then it demands its answer, and blocks the way until it 
receives it. The same applies to the man from the country as well: “Before the law 
stands a door-keeper. A man from the country comes to this door-keeper and asks for 
entry into the law.”186 The man asks admittance, he does not simply enter. When he 
asks, however, he never gets what he demands. If the man from the country had not 
been stuck with the admittance, and instead had assumed that he is already in the law 
then he would not be sentenced to waiting in front of the entrance. In startling contrast 
to the man from the country and Abraham, Josef K. acts in the exact opposite way. He 
does not want any assurance or any license, because he assumes he is already in the 
trial, not before it. I argue that the reader must act in the exact same way if/when 
reading The Trial. In order to read, or to continue to read, the reader must die a death 
similar to Josef K.’s in A Dream, and must affirm again and again with each word, that 
s/he is still reading. As long as the reader reads The Trial, s/he is not before The Trial 
any more, but already in it. The trial does not only call Josef K. but it also calls the 
reader. We may not hear, not answer the call of the work and thus, not read The Trial. 
That is surely a possibility. But then, The Trial would not be [written], just like Josef 
K.’s trial: “What is a book no one reads?” asks Blanchot, and answers, “[s]omething 
that is not yet written.”187 The reader must participate in The Trial, and let it be just like 
Josef K. lets his trial be. If the reader rejects the call of The Trial, then The Trial will 
cease to be, because just like Josef K.’s trial, The Trial does not exist as long as it is not 
read. Although in ink and paper The Trial exists, “it awaits the liberating decision, the 
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‘Lazare, veni foras’” which only the reader can make.188 The Trial calls its reader to be 
entangled in it, in other words, to be arrested by it. 
 
 
 
a. The Reader: The Liar  
 
 
“Whoever reads Kafka”, says Blanchot, “is…forcibly transformed into a liar.”189 
Blanchot’s use of the word forcibly is significant; Kafka texts demand that the reader be 
a liar; “not a complete liar”, though.190 The reader is only half guilty. It shares the blame 
with words. In fact it is the words themselves which force the reader to become a liar: 
   “Whoever reads Kafka is…forcibly transformed into a liar, but not a complete  
liar. That is the anxiety peculiar to his art …. We undergo the immediate 
 experience of an imposture we think we are able to avoid, against which we 
 struggle (by reconciling contradictory interpretations) ─ and this effort is 
 deceptive, yet we consent to it, and this laziness is betrayal. Subtlety, 
 shrewdness, candor, loyalty, negligence, are all equally the means to a mistake 
 (a deception) that is in the truth of the words, in their exemplary power, in their 
 clarity, their interest, their assurance, their power to lead us on, let us fall, pick 
 us up again, in the unfailing faith in their meaning that does not permit one  either 
 to leave or to follow it.”191   
 
The reader lies, yet words are not innocent either; they lie too. If one part of the 
deception is constituted by the lying reader, then the other part, in fact the bigger part, is 
brought about by the words themselves. Words are all we have but we cannot trust 
them. They leave us vulnerable and perplexed because everything seems to be possible. 
After all “[c]ontradiction does not reign in this world”, only ambiguity reigns: 192 
“[E]ach word, each image, each story can signify its opposite ─and the opposite of that 
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as well─.”193 Blanchot underlines this ambiguity the text forces upon the reader: Neither 
can we cling to the words, nor can we abandon them totally. With the first sentence of 
The Trial we try to be reconciled with the text, to fit it into some kind of system so that 
we may anticipate and eliminate some possibilities the work might have in store for us. 
Yet these trials fall to pieces. The name of the system of law for example, is scattered 
everywhere in the work. Although the frequent use of the name makes the system 
─meaning any structure that offers logic and consistency─ seem to be there, behind this 
façade stands a vast void. Here, everything is possible, any possibility is valid! The 
reader is thrown into the sea of infinite possibilities. If a word may signify its opposite, 
then how is the reader to know which one is the truth? In fact it is precisely because the 
reader cannot ever know that s/he must make assumptions, and continue to read only 
upon these assumptions. Although “[e]ach sentence says ‘interpret me’”, and this 
interpretation is a matter of life and death, the reader is left to his own in this lethal 
journey of meaning.194 Each reader must take up the heavy weight of making lethal 
assumptions, and follow them only to wind up in falsehood.  As you may already guess, 
this world is very similar to that of Josef K. The structure of the work is such that it 
demands from its reader what it had demanded from Josef K., that is, the Prozeß is not 
only Josef K.’s trial, but also the reader’s.  
The readers’ trials to read The Trial explode into interpretations, which result in a 
potentially infinite number of legends like the ones that the Prometheus parable 
suggests. The infinite possibilities of reading The Trial only point to its inexplicability. 
“True reading remains impossible” in Kafka, and once truth is taken away we are left 
only with assumptions.195 These assumptions, which we may also call interpretations, 
give birth to as many unique legends as their readers. Each reading produces its own 
unique legend. Such an infinite possibility of reading resembles the infinite number of 
possibilities that Josef K. becomes exposed to in the face of the inexplicable, which is 
the court. The Trial is inexplicable to the reader as much as the trial or the court is 
inexplicable to Josef K. As I have already discussed, these possibilities do not prevent 
Josef K. from entering into the court because he makes assumptions and acts on them as 
if they are truth. Josef K. assumes that he is already in the trial. The reader of Josef K. 
                                                           
193 Blanchot, Maurice. The Work of Fire, p. 9 
194 Adorno, Theodor. “Notes on Kafka” in Prisms. Trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber. 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1981. Rpt. in in Modern Critical Views: Franz Kafka. ed. 
Harold Bloom. New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1986, p. 96 
195 Blanchot, The Work of Fire, p. 4 
 
 
49 
 
must do the same; it must assume that s/he is already in The Trial and let The Trial 
receive him/her, just like the law receives Josef K. The reader must accept the deception 
that is in the truth of the words. In other words, the reader must deceive him/herself in 
the same manner as Josef K. does with respect to his trial, and assume that this 
deception is truth. In that sense the word deception is crucial; the reader does not have 
to believe that the deception is true, s/he only has to believe that it is necessary if his/her 
trial, or reading, is to take place. The reader must accept one and the same law Josef K. 
accepts, that is, you must make assumptions and act on them as if they are truth. The 
reader must lie if the reading is to take place, and must read The Trial in the same way 
that Josef K. reads his trial so that the work can acquire existence. Reading is to hear the 
silent call of the work and say yes to it. It is thus becoming Josef K. and welcoming The 
Trial, and letting it be, “each time the first and each time the only.”196 “Kafka has no 
story to tell”, says David I. Grossvogel, and he adds, “he conveys a mood, an anxiety 
─his anxiety.”197 The Trial is not a book, but the anxiety itself. The anxiety performs 
itself in and through The Trial, and vice versa, The Trial lets the anxiety manifest itself. 
In that sense, to read The Trial is not to read yet another book, just as Blanchot 
suggests, “[t]o read a poem is not to read yet another poem.”198 
   “The reading of a poem is the poem itself, affirming itself in the reading as a 
 work. It is the poem giving birth, in the space held open by the reader, to the 
 reading that welcomes it; it is the poem becoming the power to read.”199 
Reading The Trial is the action, the gesture, the Prozeß itself. Each reader opens a 
unique space in which the work becomes alive, and it is in and through this space that 
the work performs itself:  
   “[T]he book which has its origin in art has no guarantee in the world, and when 
 it is read, it has never been read before. It does not come into its presence as a 
 work except in the space opened by this unique reading, each time the first and 
 each time the only.”200 
 
If reading is participation in the open violence, that is the work, as Blanchot suggest, 
then that participation demands that the reader become a liar. I suggest that the reader 
becomes a liar only after dying a death similar to Josef K.’s death in A Dream which 
makes it possible for him to be reborn as a reader. This means that the resurrection of 
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the work demands the birth of the individual as a reader. In other words, the resurrection 
work demands the death of the individual so that s/he can be reborn as a reader and give 
life to it. The reader takes part in the work’s journey from absence to presence. As a 
matter of fact, this resurrection is made possible only thanks to the reader. The work 
does not exist separately from its reader. Rather the reader lets the work be liberated, 
and become alive just like Jesus brings Lazarus back from death. The work is dead 
without the reader, it does not exist. In that aspect, reading “evokes the divine aspect of 
creation.”201  In that sense the reader is like an artist. Consequently, what threatens 
reading the most would be to refuse to die and thus, refuse to deny the truth of that 
individual ─which may very well be thought of as refusing to lie─. Here I slightly alter 
the meaning of the word liar, and use it in a more comprehensive and different way than 
Blanchot, but I think the essential point still holds and this altered meaning sheds a 
different light on the discussion of the lying of the reader. First of all, to lie means to 
accept the delusion that assumption is truth itself. Taking assumption as truth could be 
thought of as a kind of lying because you act as if you know when you do not in fact 
know. When those assumptions turn out to be wrong, as in the case of Josef K., you are 
thrown only further away from truth. Secondly, we can think of the death Josef K. dies 
in his dream in the parable A Dream is a perfect manifestation of Josef K.’s refusal of 
the truth of the pre-death individual who belongs to the world, as opposed to the post-
death reader who now exists in a different mode. Although after the death Josef K. 
becomes a different person than before, ─he has become a reader now─ we could still 
think of it as a refusal of the old self. In a way the new self turns its back on the older 
one and acts as if it did not exist. Because becoming a reader would necessitate that the 
reader self denies the pre-death self, this might also count as lying. With this 
connections established, it becomes apparent that in terms of becoming a reader, to die 
and to lie are essentially related. To refuse to die is to persist in being the same 
individual and staying in the world, whereas to die is to be born again in a different 
mode of existence. W. H. Sokel describes this new mode of being as becoming literary 
language, or a linguistic figure.202 He says, “[t]o become literary language, the self has 
to die to this life, as Josef K. has to die in his dream, if the artist’s immortalizing script 
is to be completed on his grave.”203 I offer to add a new item to the equation above: To 
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become a reader the self has to die to this world, and is to become a linguistic being. 
Staying in this world and judging the work with the logic thereof block the way to 
reading, and thus the way to existence of the work. “[T]he reader’s reality, his 
personality, his immodesty, his stubborn insistence upon remaining himself in the face 
of what he reads”, says Blanchot is “what most threatens reading.”204 Such an approach 
is not in line with literary reading because the work and the reader do not coincide in the 
same mode of being. In fact, since that individual has not yet died and been born as a 
reader who could give life to the work, the work does not even exist yet. Therefore 
according to this perspective the work either does not exist, or it is assumed to have a 
life independent of its reader and thus, it already exists whether it is read or not. In that 
case, however, the work would not need its reader, neither would The Trial demand of 
its reader to become a liar. Then the so-called reader could continue to be firmly rooted 
in existence in the world, and thus would not have to die. “A reading which takes the 
work for what it is…does not consist in introducing, in his place, a reader – a person 
firmly rooted in existence, having a history, a profession, a religion.”205 These features 
all point to the existence in this world where one is troubled by daily worries. Yet the 
mode of existence that literary reading requires is very different from this earthly mode. 
In sharp contrast to the so-called or fake reader of earthly life, the real reader does not 
own such features. Rather the reader who exists in language is “always fundamentally 
anonymous.”206 “He is any reader, none in particular, unique but transparent.”207 The 
Trial could only receive such a reader because only that reader can accept the deception 
and assume that s/he is already in The Trial, and thus, let The Trial be.  
Having taken a closer look at the reader’s role in the deception, I now will turn to 
the guiltier half, that is, the words themselves. I will try to analyze the form and the 
narrative structure of The Trial and answer the question how the text is able to arrest not 
only its protagonist but also its reader. All of a sudden we find ourselves as lost as Josef 
K., and try to make sense of the world and the words that we are exposed to. However, 
our efforts fail because familiar words now seem to have become unfamiliar. It is as if 
we are living in flesh and blood the very first scene in which Josef K. wakes up to find 
in his bedroom the warders who make fun of Josef K.’s words about his breakfast. Josef 
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K.’s words now have become words to be laughed at when they are uttered by the 
mouths of the warders. The same transformation occurs to us, too. Words do not carry 
us smoothly, rather they let us fall, and pick us up only to let us fall again as Blanchot 
says. Although they are our only guide in this world, they do not guide us anywhere. 
They guide us to nowhere precisely because they point at all directions at once. We get 
stuck with each word. Each word becomes an obstacle and blocks the way. As I have 
discussed earlier, Josef K. and the warders do not hear each other’s words properly. 
Although they utter the same words, they speak different languages because meanings 
of their words never coincide. In a similar way we try to decipher the language to which 
the text exposes us. Yet this task is as impossible as Josef K.’s trials to find the correct, 
or the intended, meanings of the words that he encounters. What the words mean turn 
into a question which can be answered with infinite number of possibilities, which in 
turn renders it unanswerable. “What makes our effort to read so full of anguish”, says 
Blanchot in “Reading Kafka”, “is not the coexistence of different interpretations; it is 
the mysterious possibility of seeming sometimes to have a negative meaning, 
sometimes a positive one.”208 And this is the reason why we cannot trust words. They 
are such that they can both mean and not mean at the same time. In that case we must at 
once believe and not believe them. “[R]eading Kafka”, says F. Jameson, “plunges us 
into a well-nigh interminable weighing of alternatives, a tireless back and forth between 
the pro and the contra, each of which then unfolds into its interminable consequences, 
and so on.”209 What happens on the level of words sheds its shade upon the situations 
which those tentative words give life in and through themselves. The effect of the 
possibility that a word may and may not be telling what it seems to be telling is 
multiplied infinite times when these words describe any situation or an event. This is 
how the Kafkaesque situation is born. In “Kafka’s Narrative: A Matter of Form”, 
Antony Thorlby explores the mechanisms that render a situation Kafkaesque and starts 
out by laying down what we usually mean when we use the word “situation”, and then 
traces how it turns Kafkaesque. He underlines that the word situation is mainly used 
“metaphorically to delineate an area or moment of experience.”210 In other words a 
situation “is not really there at all”; it does not exist independently on its own.211 Rather, 
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a situation is made up of a number of things such as feelings, ideas or events we 
experience in conjunction with one another.212 “Thus”, says Thorlby, “a situation can be 
resolved by introducing more factors, or eliminating some, or by rearranging them 
all.”213 However in Kafkaesque situation we miss the fundamental element that ties “a 
number of phenomena, factors of many kinds, such as persons and places, wishes and 
thoughts, things that have happened and others yet to come” together so that they “form 
a whole.”214 That essential element is the conjunction. MacMillan Online Dictionary 
defines “conjunction” as “a word that is used to join other words, phrases, clauses, and 
sentences, for example ‘and’, ‘because’, and ‘but’” (Macmillan Online Dictionary). We 
do not know how things relate to each other or what kind of relationships hold between 
them; Josef K. knows even less than us. Thorlby argues that in Kafkaesque situation we 
“see this metaphorical activity going on ─but without understanding what the 
connections are.”215 Without the information as to how things connect with each other, 
we are left only with “a mass of bizarre details inexplicably bought together.”216 We 
have already lost our trust in words; now we are rendered unable to connect those words 
flying all around us with each other so that we might see some sense this time in this 
bigger picture. Because the true relationships between things are withdrawn from us, 
and also from Josef K., and because we (both Josef K. and us) cannot read if there are 
no connections; we come to create our own connections. That is to say, we make 
assumptions and read as if they are truth only to see that they are always false.  
“Kafka’s vocabulary is one of inference and conjecture”, so says W. H. Sokel, and he 
adds, “[t]he only bridge between the protagonist and his environment is surmise”, in 
other words assumption.217 This is true for us, as readers, as well. We must infer, and 
guess in order to re-connect things with each other again. The price we have to pay is no 
small deal. These replacement connections may be correct or wrong. If they are wrong, 
then that means we now have a different situation than the one we had been having 
trouble with. Just like we had not known the true connections between things in the first 
situation, we do not know if the replacement is correct or not when we are doing it. That 
is to say, in terms of increasing the probability of truth we have not gone even one step 
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further. As a matter of fact, our assumptions always prove wrong just like Josef K.’s. 
We always discover one thing, and one thing only; that we were wrong. Yet we have to 
make them even if in the end we always discover that they were wrong.  
Because the only bridge between us and The Trial is surmise, it is as fragile and 
tentative as the bridge that binds Josef K. to his trial. Strangely enough though, it is also 
as strong and unbreakable as it is weak and fragile. Such a statement would be a 
contradiction, but as Blanchot underlines, there is no room for it in Kafka. Indeed it 
cannot exist in Kafka’s world because contradiction assumes that it is not possible that p 
and ~p exist simultaneously. Yet, in Kafka’s world everything is possible. After all each 
word “can signify its opposite ─and the opposite of that as well─.218” In that sense 
contradiction refuses to obey the one and only law in Kafka’s world, which is to take 
assumption as truth. Thus, it is expelled. Assumption defies and dethrones 
contradiction, and crowns ambiguity instead. Since neither Josef K. nor we know the 
truth, we must content ourselves with assumptions. An assumption behaves like truth as 
long as you affirm your assumption that it is true. In a similar fashion, it ceases to be 
true once you no longer assume that it is true. In that case, an assumption in itself is 
neither true nor false. It is such that it can turn into one or the other anytime. As long as 
you assume that your assumption is true, then it becomes as strong and unshakeable as 
truth itself; and when you do not affirm that it is true anymore, then it becomes weak 
and fragile and breaks into pieces.  
In his article “Parable and Paradox in Kafka’s Stories”, Alwin L. Baum argues 
that in Kafka’s narratives “everything is a matter of appearance”, and he adds, “Kafka’s 
style is …hypothetical, characterized by an interminable vielleict [perhaps].”219 This 
perhaps is so overwhelming that it forces the reader to interpret, thus to deceive 
him/herself. “Through the power with which Kafka commands interpretation, he 
collapses aesthetic distance” says Adorno in “Notes on Kafka” 220, and adds: 
   “He demands a desperate effort of the allegedly ‘disinterested’ observer of an 
 earlier time, overwhelms him, suggesting that far more than his intellectual 
 equilibrium depends on whether he truly understands; life and death are at stake. 
 … His texts are designed…to agitate his [the reader’s] feelings to a point where 
 he fears that the narrative will shoot towards him like a locomotive in a three-
 dimensional film.”221 
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Kafka does not allow the reader of Josef K. to enjoy any higher status than Josef K. The 
reader must interest him/herself in each word, and constantly reaffirm his/her interest if 
reading is to take place. The reader is no longer on the safe side; in contrast, the reader 
is as much in danger as Josef K. This desperate effort to make sense burdens the reader 
with responsibility of the assumptions s/he makes, which reduces the reader to the same 
status as Josef K. Yet without that desperate and deadly effort no reading is possible. In 
other words, to read is to accept that it is a matter of life and death. Even if in rare 
occasions the reader gets to know a little bit more than the protagonist; that only makes 
things worse for the reader because then even more possibilities open up, which will not 
move the reader any further but only block the way. W. H. Sokel also underlines this 
point and claims that Kafka “take[s] away the reader’s fictional superiority over the 
protagonist.”222 He explains how in the following way:  
   “Together with the protagonist, the reader is thrown into the basic condition of 
 every individual man: He stays imprisoned in the solitary confinement of a 
 limited and subjective consciousness that can only infer, but can never know, the 
 external world.”223  
 
We “experience the narrative” through “the solipsistic perspective” of Josef K.224 We 
are confined to his assumptions as to the situations in which he finds himself. We do not 
have any other access to the events. We only experience things only after they are 
filtered through his perception. In fact it is not the events themselves that we learn 
about; rather it is how Josef K. experiences those events. In that sense the world of The 
Trial is mediated by Josef K.’s mind. We do have another mind, the narrator, but the 
narrator is neither consistent nor omniscient. Although it might at first seem to offer an 
alternative interpretation of situations K. finds himself in, soon enough we discover that 
the narrator takes us only to more untruth. Instead of providing us with a solid ground 
on which we can evaluate and judge not only the situations Josef K. encounters but also 
Josef K.’s own interpretations of them, the narrator makes our job only more difficult 
when we discover that the narrator too, is always wrong. That Josef K.’s perception is 
mediated by the narrator makes it is as if there are two Josef K.s whose accounts are to 
be double-doubted now. We are twice removed from the true situation.  
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One such example when the narrator lets us fall, like Blanchot says of words, is 
when Josef K. is in the cathedral. While walking in the cathedral Josef K. hears the 
priest call his name. The scene of the call is described by the narrator only. We do not 
have Josef K.’s direct speech, and the earliest direct speech form the priest is his calling 
of the name and an exclamation mark, “Josef K.!”225 We experience this crucial scene 
of calling though the narrator’s words: “[H]e heard the priest’s voice for the first time. 
A powerful, practiced voice. How it pierced the expectant cathedral! …. It was 
unambiguous and there was no escape; he was calling: ‘Josef K.!’”226The narrator 
describes how this calling takes place almost in one page. The only external and 
objective data is the priest’s calling of name Josef K.. But even the name cannot escape 
interpretation of the narrator because it is followed by an exclamation mark. The 
narrator not only tells us the gestures of Josef K. and the priest but it also explains what 
those gestures should mean for the priest, Josef K. and for us. Right after the call these 
sentences appear: “K. stopped abruptly and stared at the floor. For the time being he 
was still free, he could walk on and make his way from there through one of the three 
small dark wooden doors not far in front.”227 The narrator leads us to assume that Josef 
K. has heard the call, (perhaps he has not, because the narrator says he turns his head 
only to see what the priest is doing), and that he is now contemplating how to respond 
to it. Moreover we as readers are also instructed to assume that all of a sudden there 
appears a question of freedom, and that the call is to be associated with confinement. 
Why would talking to the priest in a cathedral create a question of freedom? Does Josef 
K. know something that the reader does not know which would render the situation 
meaningful and make the question above redundant? Many such questions could follow 
one another if we stop reading on and try, instead, to find answers for these questions. 
Here in order to continue to read we must assume that these interpretations are true 
although we are quite doubtful about that. We must suspend decisions and think of all 
possible ways to interpret those interpretations. Before we hear the call, we read about 
the voice of the priest. The narrator depicts this voice as strong, authoritative and most 
importantly, as unambiguous and inescapable. However, only a few lines later we read 
that unambiguous and inescapable voice of the priest is neither unambiguous nor 
inescapable. After he calls Josef K.’s name, the priest does something that absolutely 
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conflicts with his unambiguous call, and asks Josef K. if he really is Josef K, “’You are 
Josef K.?”228 How would the priest who is portrayed as being that strong, authoritative 
and certain, not know if the person in the cathedral is him or not? Or if he does not 
know Josef K. then how could he be that unambiguous and inescapable for Josef K.?  
That call is so essential to The Trial that in a way everything, including the work, 
depends on it. It is precisely because of that the core deception is placed right here, at 
the heart. Thus, the narrator is thus to be trusted as little (and as much) as the words 
themselves. However our own interpretations are not on the safe side either. They are 
no different from Josef K.’s or the narrator’s. In fact they are the most mediated ones 
among the three because they are three times removed from the real event. 
These examples prove only one point: As long as we insist on truth and refuse to 
make assumptions, we are unable to move. We cannot read; we become paralyzed at the 
entrance. We are drowned in questions without answers. Each word or each 
interpretation becomes an obstacle then. Instead, the reader must continue to read; and 
in order to continue to read it must accept the one and only law, the law of assumption.  
 
 
 
b. The Undoing of Untruth  
 
 
 So we have before us a mystery which we cannot 
comprehend. And precisely because it is a mystery we 
have right to preach it, to teach people that what matters 
is neither freedom nor love, but the riddle, mystery to 
which they have to bow ─without reflection and even 
against their conscious.  
                         Dostoevsky, Grand Inquisitor 
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 And though the truth will not be discovered by such means 
─never can that stage be reached─ yet they [my inquiries] 
throw light on some of the profounder ramifications of 
falsehood.  
                            Kafka, Investigations of a Dog 
 
If “language itself is the arch-liar”, as H. Politzer suggests, and yet it is all we 
have, then could there still be any chance to reach truth?229 Kafka seems to have hopes. 
What Blanchot says of Kafka’s work could also be said of language: “[E]verything in it 
is obstacle, but everything in it can also become a step.”230 Let language be the arch-
liar; maybe those lies could become our steps. Even if truth may not be discovered by 
such means, lies can be, and that would take us closer to truth.  
W. H. Sokel in his article “Language and Truth in Kafka” underlines that “Kafka 
condemns literature” because of its referential character.231 It is a substitute for living 
the life; it is like “putting of wreaths around the house instead of moving in.”232 It only 
refers, as opposed to be that which it refers to. “Primacy belongs to life, to acts and 
feelings, not to words.”233 In his diary entry of 1921 Kafka complains of this parasitical 
life of words, saying:  
   “The dependency of writing. Its dependence on the maid making the fire, on the 
 cat warming itself by the stove, even on the poor old person warming himself. 
 All these are independent, autonomous activities; writing alone is helpless, does 
 not dwell in itself; it is a joke, a despair.”234 
 
Such a parasitic nature “convicts writing of essential insignificance.”235 Writing 
does not dwell in itself, it does not live; it only refers to that which lives in the sensory 
world. In that sense, “language always remains subordinate to being”, or in other words, 
to living.236 It is secondary. However this sensory world is not the only world. In fact it 
is “only the evil in the spiritual one”, which is the only true world; “There is only one 
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spiritual world. What we call the sensory world is only the evil in the spiritual one.”237 
If there is truth, then it must reside in the spiritual world, and not in the sensory world. 
Yet, language seems to be dependent on the sensory world which is home to the cat, the 
stove or the old man but not to truth. Although the true world is not the sensory world, 
language can only refer to the sensory world. Thus, language is already twice removed 
from truth because it only refers to the sensory world, and because it only refers ─as 
opposed to be, or live─ to the sensory world.  This is why language “can never be the 
instrument of truth.”238 Kafka continues to explore the relationship between language 
and the spiritual world, saying, “For anything outside the sensory world, language can 
be used only allusively, but never, not even approximately, by way of analogies, since 
it, in correspondence to the sensory world, only deals with possession and 
relationships.”239 “Paradoxically, however”, says Sokel, “this debasement of language 
… allows a substantial elevation of the status of literature.”240 It is this passage that 
gives us hope that language may indeed open up a new possibility in our journey to 
truth. From here we can deduce that language may be non-referential and thus be freed 
from its parasitical life by alluding to the true world. Now language, which was twice 
removed from truth, becomes closer to truth: 
   “Here language does not depend on ‘the autonomous activities’ going on in the 
 sensory world. On the contrary, language ─i.e., a very special kind of non-
 referential, merely allusive language─ is a means by which human beings may 
 receive an inkling of the invisible, true world.”241 
 
Language still does not express truth, but now it can “point to it and thus sharpen human 
awareness for it”, which means that it can take us closer to truth.242 Despite being the 
arch-liar, literature could come to fly around truth. “Kafka’s trust in literature was still 
remarkable”, says Blanchot, and quotes from Kafka:  
   “Art flies around truth, but with the determination not to get burnt by it. Its skill 
 consists of finding a place in the void where the ray of light focuses most 
 powerfully, without knowing beforehand the location of the light source itself.”243 
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Literature does not know the source of the light or possess truth; rather it experiences or 
feels it. This applies to Kafka’s writing as well. The text does not present truth, because 
it does not “contain a finished truth.”244 Rather, “[t]he only ‘trace’ of truth is its absence 
made manifest by the refutation” of assumptions of Josef K. and the reader.245 Kafka’s 
work is defined by the felt absence of truth. The Trial is one such masterpiece. Nothing 
is revealed other than that the assumption was wrong, that it was only a deception or 
illusion. Neither Josef K. nor we ever get to learn truth; we only learn what is not true. It 
is as if Der Prozeß itself is the process or trial of trying to reach truth. Both Josef K. and 
we as readers are on the move, and the work is nothing but this motion itself. “Kafka’s 
fiction”, says David Constantine, “is an act of seeking, it is a would-be discovery, 
invention.” 246  Echoing Blanchot, who says “[t]he reading of a poem is the poem 
itself”247, David Constantine underlines that The Trial is: 
   “an event, not the record of an event”, “[i]t is in process, it is underway”… “The 
 truth is not in the writer’s possession when he starts, his writing is not the 
 recording or recounting of a truth he is already master of; his writing is his 
 laborious struggle towards that truth.”248  
 
“[S]entence by sentence seeking after truth”, Kafka fails, and drags us (both Josef K. 
and us as readers) along with him. 249  We read only to find out that Josef K.’s 
assumptions and our assumptions were wrong. W. H. Sokel argues that this structure of 
failing to reach truth is reflected in The Trial as follows:  
    “[S]ome falsehood, some deception or self-deception, is contradicted and 
 exposed. The protagonist, who embodies this falsehood, is forced to retreat, one 
 way or another. The official viewpoint of the work, represented by the 
 protagonist, is found to be untrue. Since the reader does not gain access to any 
 other consciousness in the work, and since the narrator withholds all revealing 
 commentary, the reader first tends to be persuaded by the protagonist and to side 
 with him. Close reading calls this support into question. Too many indications 
 emerge that make the protagonist’s claim untenable. His defeat…is revealed as 
 the refutation of a false claim.”250 
 
Josef K. and we are called to read, and thus participate in the new world that Josef K. 
faces and Josef K. makes us face. Comprehension does not work because what stands in 
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front of the reader (both Josef K. and us) is not an account of an event, i.e. the trial, 
which could be left behind after a quick glance. Instead, what the reader stands before is 
event performing itself in and through the reading of the reader. If it were a recounting 
then it would ask for understanding; but since it is the performance of the event itself, it 
demands participation. Neither Josef K. nor we can understand what is happening. We 
can only participate in it, become part of it without knowing what it is. We are mostly 
confined within Josef K.’s experience of the world. Although we can speculate about 
his perceptions and try to elaborate on them by taking into consideration whatever the 
text seems to offer us, we still end up swinging back and forth between probabilities. 
We are not allowed to go beyond that; neither is Josef K. Readers are not the only party 
that find themselves in such a desperate endeavor; our protagonist and the other 
characters are in the same prozess with us as well. “Kafka’s characters”, says D. 
Constantine, “are wonderfully able to hypothesize and set out alternatives and endlessly 
ramifying possibilities”, and are “pedantically, tiresomely, exact in their accounts.”251 
The absence of truth begets this infinite number of illegitimate children. “And in so 
doing,” he adds: 
    “they rather prove the futility of this, the best, the considerable best, that they 
 can do. Wherever the truth is, it does not seem reachable by that route. The 
 characters actually demonstrate the inadequacy of the means ─their considerable 
 powers of argument, discrimination, definition, speculation─ at their disposal. 
 They and their author are well equipped, but with something that will not help 
 them. As readers we participate in the failure of their kind of lucid reasoning.”252 
Pages of hypothetical premises culminating in hypothetical conclusions built arguments 
that do not touch the ground, but suspend in the air. All these overly sophisticated and 
intricate paths lead to nowhere except false assumptions. “Beyond that the reader is not 
able to go. He may witness the negation of an untruth. The truth remains shrouded from 
him.”253 However, that an assumption turns out to be false does not prove that the 
opposite of what it had suggested or the other rival assumption would be true. This rule 
would work only in a world where contradiction reigns. Yet in The Trial, the throne 
belongs to ambiguity.  
“The Trial examines in a rational and comprehensive manner the implications of 
an irrational premise”, says Henry Sussman, and continues, saying, “‘Someone must 
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have been telling lies about Josef K., for without having done anything wrong he was 
arrested one fine morning’. In its tone, this sentence already reveals much of the 
distinctly Kafkan ominousness, a sense that the worst has already and ineluctably 
transpired. Who is this ‘someone’? We can only infer that this hypothetical agent has 
been calumniating Josef K., for the turn of events has taken place in an informational 
blackout…Only hypothesis…can account for this downturn.”254 Having no other guide 
than the ill-equipped Josef K. ─who is himself lost─, the reader embarks on the journey 
on the side of Josef K. But with each sentence s/he is haunted by insecurity. “We 
undergo the immediate experience of an imposture we think we are able to avoid, 
against which we struggle (by reconciling contradictory interpretations) ─ and this 
effort is deceptive, yet we consent to it.”255 Although at the outset we think that we can 
keep things under control and keep the imposture at a safe distance from ourselves, 
when The Trial starts, our trials to reconcile with the text immediately fall to pieces. We 
get even more lost than Josef K.: 
   “The reader, having first sided with the protagonist, on the second thought is 
 tempted to rectify his mistake, and is inclined to see the counterworld as being 
 right. However, on a third ‘reading’ ─each ‘reading’ standing for a level of 
 meaning further removed from the surface─ he would realize that not even that 
 equation holds, and that there is no way of establishing the ‘truth’. All that can 
 be uncovered are successive layers of untruth.”256  
D. Constantine argues that this successive, but unsuccessful “laborious enquiry after 
truth, is not just a subject of Kafka’s texts but is very warp and weft. It is the nexus out 
of which they arise.”257 In other words The Trial is Kafka’s, Josef K.’s and our failure to 
reach at truth.  
W. H. Sokel draws attention to the place of language in this failure to capture 
truth, and puts forward that this failure is nothing other than language’s failure to 
express truth: 
   “[S]uch a procedure demonstrates the inadequacy of all language to express the 
 truth. All language can show is the ‘retreat’ of untruth. The process of making 
 untruth evident is the only ‘light’ that language can shed on truth”. “The way for 
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 literature is therefore not to try to express the truth, but to hint at it by showing 
 the undoing of untruth.”258 
The Trial reveals that truth is missing. That is, it makes the absence or the lack become 
apparent. It does not express or communicate truth to the reader, but it does 
communicate the anxiety of missing that truth, “this state of ignorance and felt 
inappropriateness” (Thorlby, 2010). It flies us around truth; it takes us to the place in the 
void, which makes us participate in that missing of truth, and experience the anxiety. 
The work performs that flying around truth, and by reading the reader does the same. 
This is the communication per se. “The work is itself communication”, as Blanchot also 
suggests.259 “Communication of the work”, says Blanchot “does not lie in the fact that it 
has become communicable, through reading, to a reader.”260 “To read is thus not to 
obtain communication from the work, but to ‘make’ the work communicate itself”, in 
other words, let the work be.261 “In this communication it is obscurity that must reveal 
itself and the night that must dawn. This is revelation where nothing appears, but where 
concealment becomes appearance.”262 The Trial is precisely this work. Reading is not 
extracting truth from the text; and neither is the text itself is the work. The reader 
liberates the work from the text and thus, makes the work perform itself. In so doing, 
the reader also takes part in the performance. In fact, Blanchot describes this 
participation with a special word: “He [the reader] partakes of the work as the unfolding 
of something in the making, the intimacy of the void which comes to be.”263  
In “Franz Kafka: On the Tenth Anniversary of His Death”, Benjamin also chooses 
the same word to describe the parable of the doorkeeper in The Trial, saying, “[I]t is as 
if the novel were nothing but the unfolding of the parable.”264 Then he continues with 
his clarification as to what the unfolding is like:  
    “The word ‘unfolding’ has a double meaning. A bud unfolds into a blossom, 
 but the boat which one teaches children to make by folding paper unfolds into a 
 flat sheet of paper….Kafka’s parables, however, unfold in the first sense, the 
 way a bud turns into a blossom. That is why their effect resembles poetry.”265  
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Benjamin also warns readers against reading Kafka in the second sense of the word, 
which he likens to a flat sheet of paper, “This second kind of ‘unfolding’ is really 
appropriate to the parable; it is the reader’s pleasure to smooth it out so that he has the 
meaning on the palm of his hand.”266 The reader who is rigorously looking for truth 
wants to have truth in the palm of his/her hand, and capture it. Then everything becomes 
clear and meaningful, and thus makes sense. Things become accountable, because now 
they are placed within a system that could explain anything by some causes and effects. 
The Kafkaesque situation is resolved with a little touch here and there. Relationships are 
re-established, therefore those bizarre details flying in the air are now parts of a whole. 
Now the text communicates something, or something is being communicated through 
the text. The text comes to be the holder of a message whose addressee is the reader. It 
has turned into an account. The text acts as the means through which a message is 
conveyed to the reader. The reader is here; the message is there, in the book; and 
reading will enable the reader to receive the message that the words hold. When reading 
is finished, the message will have reached the reader. The text seems to already possess 
truth. All the reader has to do is to take it from among words. Such an understanding of 
language is nothing other than the bourgeoisie conception of language that Benjamin 
draws attention to in his essay “On Language as Such and on the Language of Man” 
from 1916, where things are being communicated though language: “This view is the 
bourgeoisie conception of language…It holds that the means of communication is the 
word, its object factual, and its addressee a human being.”267 The work is reduced to 
words, and the missing truth has turned into the message. Such interpretations, however, 
“miss the point of Kafka’s work.”268 They are “reductive”, says Constantine, “any such 
reading goes quite against their grain.”269 But Benjamin underlines that despite this 
threat, Kafka’s work still survives because they are parables. Parables are such that they 
take in both the “the enigma and its solution, the misunderstanding and the expression 
of this misunderstanding, the possibility of reading within the impossibility of 
interpreting this reading.”270 Parables are not consumed by misinterpretation, in a way 
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they invite it. After all, they “fatally lend themselves to interpretation.”271 But Kafka 
was a “writer of parables” precisely because they could conserve both the riddle and its 
misunderstanding.272 They can unfold in both ways; potentially it is both the bud and 
the flat sheet of paper. Which kind of unfolding awaits The Trial depends on the reader: 
    “Kafka had a rare capacity for creating parables himself. Yet, his parables are 
 never exhausted by what is explainable; on the contrary, he took all conceivable 
 precautions against the interpretation of his writings. One has to find one’s way 
 in them circumspectly, cautiously, and warily.”273   
 
It is as if saying, one has to fly around them, just like art flies around truth by pointing 
to in only indirectly, by alluding. Undoubtedly the reason is that every reading is a mis-
reading, every interpretation a misinterpretation. Despite the infinite number of 
misinterpretation the parable still conserves the bud even though it will never unfold 
into a blossom.  
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CHAPTER 3.  BECOMING THE PARABLE: 
 KAFKA AND WRITING 
 
 
 
 
Despite my having legibly written down my name, despite 
their having correctly written to me twice already, they 
have Josef K. down in the directory. Shall I enlighten 
them, or shall I let them enlighten me?  
                                      Kafka 
 
The Online Etymology Dictionary defines parable as “saying or story in which 
something is expressed in terms of something else.”274 It is a brief story that enables 
complicated abstract notions to speak to people in their daily life. Parable is most often 
defined in moral and religious terms, basically as a short narrative that aims to teach a 
general, moral or religious truth by translating abstract notions to everyday language so 
that what it wants to convey can become available for everyone. Parable in that sense 
aims at explanation and clarification by making concepts meet the corporeal everyday 
life. Thus, rather than adopting a language full of abstractions, parable “always teaches 
by comparison with real or literal occurrences --especially … everyday occurrences a 
wide number of people can relate to.”275 In that sense parable bridges the gap lying 
between the general truth –be it religious or moral- or knowledge and the particular 
individual cases of everyday life. The use of everyday language is particularly 
significant. Everyday language is the language that everybody always already 
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anticipates. When those abstract truths, be it moral or religious or any other kind, are 
translated into everyday language, then they can reach everybody’s ears precisely 
because everybody can hear it. Such parables illuminate the right path so that its hearers 
can see and follow it. Jewish tradition too adopts parable as an enlightening tool which 
makes truth –the Script- meet the life. Parable translates the Hebrew word mashal, 
which is essential to midrash, the Jewish tradition of scriptural exegesis.276 Taking into 
account Kafka’s “own clumsy Judaism” and his interest in Jewish culture and Yiddish 
literature dating back to 1911, which is right before the period Kafka produces his 
mature works and himself calls it his breakthrough; it could prove very useful to 
examine the place of parable within the Jewish tradition in order to better understand 
what Kafka makes of it.277 
Matthew T. Powell explains that Midrashic tradition is fond of different 
possibilities emerging out of the Script, and adds that in the Hebrew tradition the Script 
is believed to have “70 faces.”278 Such possibilities point to the Script’s being “an 
endless fount of information and instruction” and thus, shows that it is perfectly capable 
of taking different shapes at different times and thus translating itself to particular 
situations at hand. 279  Powell emphasizes the special place of the Jewish parable, 
mashal, by referring to the two fundamental types of meanings which the Midrashic 
tradition sees in the Scripture: P’shat, a literal-historical meaning; and D’rash, an 
ethical-instructional meaning. The first type talks about the literal meaning of the 
particular situation described in the parable. The second is concerned with the beyond 
literariness of that particular situation. It aims to make its hearers go beyond. Powell 
argues that midrash uses parable exactly for this step from the literal to what is beyond 
the literal. Parable does not only illuminate and instruct but prescribes action as well. It 
aims to mobilize a particular kind of action in the hearer, therefore assumes a rhetorical 
mission to persuade the hearer into the action as well: It asks from its hearer to “process 
the scriptural passage as it relates to their world and their life.”280  In other words, 
parable wants its hearers to interpret the Scripture, to take the step to that beyond, to 
transform the passage so that it can guide him and transform his action in return. 
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However the very first task of parable is not to mobilize the hearer, but to convince him 
of the truth present in the text in order to fuel that mobilization.281 It is that already-
awaiting-truth that makes the steps taken into beyond meaningful. Truth is there, in the 
parable; what the hearer is to do is only to process that truth, to take what is already 
given to him in and through the parable. Parable is the bridge hanging between truth and 
people. Walking through the parable they can reach truth. In that sense the Midrashic 
interpreter is “literally a translator: one who carries the text across a divide, who 
negotiates the space between the text and its comprehension.”282 Through the parable’ 
being interpreted the “Scripture speaks to the world ‘now’ instead of being heard mainly 
as an echo from the past.”283It is critical to note that in order for the Scripture to 
constantly translate itself to the contemporary world, the community has to teach the 
coming generation: first, that the truth exists and it is waiting to be disclosed; second, 
how to interpret parable so that they can access to truth residing in it for themselves; 
and third, how to transmit truth to the generation that will come after them. In the 
Jewish tradition in order for mashal to fulfill its function as an exegetical vehicle, 
parable needs to be read against a certain background, in other words, a particular 
context which assures that the community, the truth and the interpretation are all in their 
places.284 This referentiality is a defining characteristic of parable. If there is any failure 
in these steps, then it becomes impossible to interpret the parable in the proper way, and 
to access to truth. And that would mean the widening of the gap between truth and the 
community. Family has the most critical role in securing the system by providing the 
children the necessary education. It is in the circle of the family that the new 
generations learn all these and (re)establish their Judaism. This is how the Scripture will 
stay alive and meaningful, and not be reduced to an impractical echo from the past.  
The importance of the community and family in the continuity of Jewish tradition 
becomes much more telling once we take into account Kafka’s relation to his father 
(and thus to his Judaism) and also the general situation of the Jews in Bohemia. The 
Kafka family is far away from making him feel part of the family let alone the Jewish 
community. Franz is born to a newly emerging bourgeoisie family whose ties with 
                                                           
281 Powell, p .280 
282 Qtd. in Powell, p. 280 
283 Ibid, p. 279 
284 Ibid, p. 280 
 
 
69 
 
authentic Judaism had wore out.285Hermann Kafka, the son of a butcher in Bohemian 
ghetto, comes to the capital city to work and rise in the social ladder ─which he indeed 
achieves. He acquires a dry goods store which earns him a lot of money and thus 
enables his family to reach better standards of life. Julie Kafka is a great help to him in 
the work. “The Kafkas” says W. H. Sokel: 
    “were in many ways a typical Jewish couple of their region of the world in their 
 time. They reflected the situation of the strenuously assimilating, but not yet fully 
 assimilated, rising Jewish bourgeoisie, frantically trying to advance economically,
  which for them also meant  socially, in an environment which provided a 
 deceptive appearance of equality, prosperity, and security, a false picture of social 
 integration which in actuality they did not enjoy.”286 
 
Before the Emperor Franz Josef, the “fiercely Catholic and anti-Jewish”287  Austro-
Hungarian empire has severe restrictions on the Jewish population.  With his assertion 
to power Emperor Franz Josef changes the inequalities in laws so as to make the state 
benefit from the trading activities of the community. In fact, Kafka’s parents give his 
name to their son for their gratitude of the improvement in their status as Jews. Yet the 
anti-Semitic laws, though now unwritten, are still in full force, not only in German but 
also in Czech society. Therefore the equality on the papers cannot translate itself to the 
everyday public life. A meticulously observant member of a Jewish family, Kafka feels 
the “profound discrepancy between the appearance of solidity and a reality of 
alienation”, and the “hopeless split between what seemed to be solid ground under his 
feet and the suspicion that things were really not holding together very well and might 
fly apart at any moment.”288 With the passing of the new laws Jewish population flood 
into cities from the ghettoes. Hermann Kafka is among the first generation of this 
“officially emancipated immigrant Jews” in Prague.289They adopt German, the language 
of the upper class of the society and also of governance and officialdom and 
“abandoned the Yiddish idiom they had spoken for centuries and which had united all 
Jews of Ashkenasi Europe.”290 This abandonment is only one aspect of the incomplete 
assimilation of the Jews. Taking full advantage of the newly opened way to insert 
themselves into the society, they cling to business opportunities. Since their place in the 
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society could be justified basically on the business and economical activities, Jewish 
population become more and more devoted to them, which, according to Sokel, “not 
infrequently spawned a crass materialism and almost conventional conventionality.”291 
 There was an unanticipated price for the deceitful prosperity. Stéphane Moses 
underlines the importance of the family circle in terms of the preservation and 
transmission of Jewish tradition, and draws attention to the significance of the oral 
tradition. “In Jewish tradition”, Moses explains: 
    “texts themselves mean only through being taught; they are reinterpreted and re-
 actualized from generation to generation.”292This teaching takes place “in the 
 private space of the house of study and prayer, in the face-to-face encounter of 
 master and the disciple, and above all in the intimacy of the family, through the 
 personal relationship of father and son.”293 
 
The family constitutes the core of the tradition. It is not only where the religious truths 
are re-actualized each day, and more importantly it is where the tradition of the coming 
generations are prepared. When the family structure of the traditional Jewish tradition is 
disrupted then the whole tradition is threatened. The attempt of the Jewish community 
to be integrated into the German society weakens the traditional familial ties to Judaism, 
and the Jewish culture. Therefore the system which binds the Jewish community 
together and enables its continuation gets disrupted, resulting in a crisis of tradition. 
Hermann Kafka is only a typical example of emancipated Jews who, coming from 
ghettoes to the industrial city, have to work very hard to affirm their place in the 
society. Thus, both Hermann and Julie have had to work very hard. Moses emphasizes 
the purposefulness of the abandonment of traditional Judaism, saying that it “often came 
from a conscious rejection of ancient norms and values” for carving themselves a place 
to exist in the modern world.294 But this existence, which has already cost a great deal 
of hard work, has even more hardships in the store for them.  Sokel highlights that: 
    “[t]he financial success and prosperity were substitutes for lost roots and 
 traditions, compensation for a language, culture, and religious faith that had 
 sustained their ancestor in centuries of persecution, and compensation as well for 
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 the lack of that full civic participation which gentile society increasingly withheld 
 from them.”295 
 
“You are all strangers to me”, Kafka complains to his mother, “we are related by 
blood, but that never shows itself.”296 [M]y position in my own family is punishment 
enough.”297   “I live in my family…more strange than a stranger. I have not spoken an 
average of twenty words a day to my mother these last years, hardly ever said  more 
than hello to my father. … I have no family feeling.”298 So says Franz, who does not 
even feel that he belongs in his family let alone the larger community of the Jews. 
“What I have in common with Jews? I have hardly anything in common with myself 
and should stand very quietly in a corner, content that I can breathe.”299 The family in 
which Franz finds himself is one that is living though this transition, like the other 
Jewish families in Bohemia. Having only traces of Judaism himself, and fanatically 
devoted to his store, Herman Kafka is far from the traditional authentic Jewish father 
who is the guarantor of not only the contemporary Jewish tradition but also the coming 
one. The mother Julie Kafka too does not have time for their son. All in all, Franz never 
receives enough affection which would assure a stable universe for him. 
The distorted relationship between Kafka and the father, and also the mother 
(whom Kafka sees as the ally of the father) reflects itself in how Kafka becomes 
introduced to Judaism and Jewish tradition and culture as well. “But what sort of 
Judaism was it that I got from you?” he asks in The Letter, and gives his answer: 300 
    “It was indeed, so far as I could see, a mere nothing, a joke—not even a joke. 
 Four days a year you went to the synagogue, where you were, to say the least, 
 closer to the indifferent than to those who took it seriously, patiently went through 
 the prayers as a formality, sometimes amazed me by being able to show me in the 
 prayer book the passage that was being said at the moment, and for the rest, so 
 long as I was present in the synagogue (and this was the main thing) I was 
 allowed to hang around wherever I liked. And so I yawned and dozed through the 
 many hours (I don't think I was ever again so bored, except later at dancing 
 lessons)… I was not fundamentally disturbed in my boredom, unless it was by the 
 bar mitzvah, but that demanded no more than some ridiculous memorizing, in 
 other words, it led to nothing but some ridiculous passing of an examination; and, 
 so far as you were concerned, by little, not very significant incidents, as when you 
 were called to the Torah and passed, in what to my way of feeling was a purely 
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 social event… That's how it was in the synagogue; at home it was, if possible, 
 even poorer… This was the religious material that was handed on to me.”301 
 
Judaism, which could give Franz the chance to connect to the family and also to the 
community of the Jew at large and solidify his sense of belonging, is presented to him 
as devoid of any authentic meaning and feeling by his father. Instead, it becomes yet 
another region of the father, and thus source of guilt.  
    “You really had brought some traces of Judaism with you from the ghetto-like 
 village community; it was not much and it dwindled a little more in the city… but 
 it was too little to be handed on to the child; it all dribbled away while you were 
 passing it on. … [T]he few flimsy gestures you performed in the name of 
 Judaism…  For you they had meaning as little souvenirs of earlier times, and that 
 was why you wanted to pass them on to me, but since they no longer had any 
 intrinsic value… this could not be successful. It was not a matter of any sort of 
 instruction  you ought to have given your children, but of an exemplary life. Had 
 your  Judaism been stronger, your example would have been more compelling 
 too.”302 
 
Kafka asks how his father, who does not have enough of Judaism even for himself, 
could reproach [him] “for not making an effort (for the sake of piety at least, as you put 
it) to cling to a similar, insignificant scrap.”303  Here Moses calls attention to “the 
inconsistencies of a demand [of father] that the son remain loyal to values father had not 
succeeded in transmitting to him (nor even legitimizing)”, and calls this the double 
bind.304  “This double bind”, he explains: 
    “reflects the uncertainties of a transitional generation, torn between its link to 
 the past and drawn to assimilation, in which paternal authority has been 
 irredeemably devalued. Indeed, in Judaism the permanence of tradition rests 
 precisely upon the intangible strength of this authority; it is the authority of the 
 father that guarantees the authenticity and the ever-resent validity of divine 
 Law.”305 
What Kafka observes in the father is not belief or worship, but only parodies of it which 
are done not for the sake of the divine Law but done “with an effort to be seen by the 
right people ─namely Jewish millionaires─ in the right places ─ namely the temple on 
High Holidays.” 306  For Hermann Kafka, the Law is “nothing more than an empty 
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container devoid of meaning.”307 When Kafka complains of being condemned to live in 
the world of the father, he probably means that he cannot free himself from that Law 
which does not have any content but only authority. Thus, the divine Law is not 
accessible any more. What has been transmitted to Kafka is only the responsibility to 
pass down what he is not given in the first place. When the father sees that Kafka is not 
clinging to what he himself has been clinging (instead of the authentic Judaism), the 
father accuses Kafka of malevolent betrayal.308 
Benjamin says, “Kafka’s work presents a sickness of tradition” where wisdom, 
that is the “the epic side of truth”, is nowhere to be found. 309  Moses refers to 
Benjamin’s “The Storyteller” where he elaborates on the epic side of truth, which is 
wisdom, and its transmission. Benjamin argues that wisdom is transmitted through 
storytelling, in other words, through the story. The structure of narrative assures a 
coherent world by providing a particular view of the world from an internally-coherent 
perspective. Wisdom lies in seeing a coherent narrative in the chaotic world. Moses 
explains that when Benjamin says the sickness of tradition, he is pointing at nothing but 
the impossibility of providing any coherent story. “It is this consistency of truth that has 
been lost.”310 But what Kafka’s stories assure is not a stable and secure world founded 
upon coherent truth, but the exact opposite, a world that constantly wavers, shaking 
from head to toe. “This is why,” says Benjamin, in Kafka, “we can no longer speak of 
wisdom. Only the products of its decay remain.”311 Among what remains is “the rumor 
about the true things (a sort of theological whispered intelligence dealing with matters 
discredited and obsolete).”312 Rumors are the decay of truth. In the sickness of tradition, 
instead of truth, all we have is the rumors; and rumors do not necessitate that there 
really is a truth. The only truth at hand is the truth of rumors and nothing more.  
“Kafka’s writings are by their nature parables” says Benjamin. Yet these parables 
are very different from mashal. Instead of illuminating the true path to be taken or the 
true way to see things, Kafka’s parables “raise a mighty paw against” submission, 
whether be it submission to any truth or submission to any interpretation which would 
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twist and bend the story so that it can appear to present an internally-coherent truth.313 
Kafka’s parables shine with a light that “only illuminates the depth of the abyss”; they 
only darken.314 In that sense they serve to devil ─just like Kafka says writing does─,  
not to the divine. In 1911 when a Yiddish Theatre comes to Prague, and Kafka meets 
Löwy, whom will become a close friend. Thanks to him and the theatre, Kafka becomes 
introduced to a new kind of Judaism, different from the father’s. Kafka never misses 
any play of them, and becomes deeply involved with Jewish tradition and Yiddish 
Literature. He reads Talmud and Kabbalah, even tries to learn Hebrew. Thus Kafka 
learns more and more about Judaism, an essential component of which is midrashic 
mashal, the parable. As already discussed, in Jewish tradition mashal presents a 
coherent picture of the world, illuminates the path to truth, transmits wisdom, and 
prescribes taking (the right) action. Yet the parables of a German-speaking Jewish son 
to whom neither divine truth nor the Jewish tradition has been handed down undermines 
the very foundations upon which both parable and also the coherency and truth 
presented in and through the parable are built. Neither story nor wisdom remains intact. 
This is why Bernheimer defines Kafka’s texts as metatextual parables, which make 
parable” undo the concept of parable advanced in the text itself.”315 In that sense, 
Kafka’s parables are parables of mashals, undermining their of status vis-à-vis truth and 
the rumor of truth. They point to the gap between the hearer and the rumor of truth; and 
make the hearer experience the unbridgeable-ness of the gap. We know nothing of truth. 
All one can do is to waver around it. Kafka’s parable transmits the nebulousness of the 
world as it appears to Kafka, uncertainty of existence as he feels it to his bones.  
In fact, Kafka even has a parable titled “On Parables”, written in the last years of 
his life, which Sokel holds to be “the final statement of his poetics.”316  
    “On Parables 
Many complain that the words of the wise are always merely parables and of no 
use in daily life, which is the only life we have. When the sage says: "Go over," he 
does not mean that we should cross to some actual place, which we could do 
anyhow if the labor were worth it; he means some fabulous yonder, something 
unknown to us, something that he cannot designate more precisely either, and 
therefore cannot help us here in the very least. All these parables really set out to 
say merely that the incomprehensible is incomprehensible, and we know that 
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already. But the cares we have to struggle with every day: that is a different 
matter.  
Concerning this a man once said: Why such reluctance? If you only followed the 
parables you yourselves would become parables and with that rid of all your daily 
cares. 
Another said: I bet that is also a parable. 
The first said: You have won. 
The second said: But unfortunately only in parable. 
The first said: +o, in reality: in parable you have lost.”
317  
 
Sokel argues that On Parables is a parable about Kafka’s poetics, about literature, about 
literary or poetic discourse and its applicability to life.”318 What is of crucial importance 
here is the shift of meaning in the parable.  
 The parable opens with the discontent that the many give voice to, concerning the 
gap between what the wise say and the everyday life people live. Here what the many 
mean by parable is the mashal, the bridge between truth or law and everyday life. In 
mashal, literature submits to the divine truth and serves as a tool of action.319 With the 
intervention of the first man and his suggestion of following the parable, however, 
things get complicated. Sokel argues that here the meaning of the word parable 
undergoes a drastic change. Here Kafka’s parable rises a mighty paw against 
submission. Sokel divides the statement into two parts, the first part being the 
conditional if clause, and the second part hypothetical condition fulfilled; and says that 
the shift of meaning occurs just here:  
   “In part one, Gleichnis still means ‘parable’ [mashal]. It conveys this sense: If 
 the many were to imitate and carry out the precepts of the sages  perfectly, 
 ‘follow’ them as disciples ‘follow’ their masters, they too would become paragons 
 of desirable behavior, emulated by all. Being supported by action, literature would 
 and can make a difference in life. However, this is not the meaning, at least not 
 the literal meaning, of Gleichnis in part two; in fact, it clashes with it. For part two 
 literally advises an empirical impossibility: the transformation of human beings 
 into linguistic structures.”320 
 
Becoming the parable, when seen from the perspective of everyday reality, could only 
make sense metaphorically simply because you literally cannot become the parable. 
Another said: I bet that is also a parable. 
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The first said: You have won. 
The second said: But unfortunately only in parable. 
The first said: +o, in reality: in parable you have lost.”
321  
 
The speaker who says that is also a parable evaluates the phrase becoming the parable 
from the perspective of everyday life. Literally it is not possible that you become 
parable in this world. “While one stays alive, the first speaker’s advice remains ‘only’ a 
metaphor. One cannot live it.” 322 Thus, the phrase can only be understood 
metaphorically. Here it is only a figure of speech; “it cannot be translated into 
action.”323  
Winning in reality, the second speaker loses in parable because if he had read the 
phrase literally then he would turn into the parable himself, like Gregor Samsa turns 
into a vermin, or Josef K. whose existence merges with that of the court. In other words, 
when you take the phrase literally and follow it, then it is no longer a metaphor for you 
precisely because you have bowed to it and become the parable. Paradoxically it would 
then no longer be merely metaphor.  
Sokel continues his argument by underlining that the parable at the very end is 
not a figure of speech any more, but “empirical reality or actuality” 324 itself: 
   “‘Wirklichkeit’. The identical spatial preposition ‘in’ ─‘in Wirklichkeit you have 
 won,’ ‘im Gleichnis you have lost’─ establishes a parallelism between two 
 localities or realms. One is the realm of action and life, what Kafka in the…diary 
 entry called ‘autonomous activities’; the other is the realm in which significance 
 takes place of the action [putting of wreaths around the house instead of moving 
 in], the ‘legendary’ realm of the Gleichnis.”325  
 
For those who follow the metaphor literally (i.e. Kafka, Josef K., Gregor Samsa and the 
reader) and become the parable themselves, the distinction between the two realms does 
not hold any more. The gap between meaning and being, literature and everyday life 
ceases to exist because they blend into each other; they become one another. Literature 
becomes life and meaning becomes being. Now “the parable is daily life, and daily life 
is a parable.”  Josef K. and Gregor Samsa both wake up into the world of Gleichnis 
where to be and to write (in other words, to read) is not separate from each other, but 
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one and the same. The Trial is nothing other than Kafka’s, Josef K.’s and the reader’s 
metamorphosis. 
Kafka follows the parable, takes the metaphor literally and turns into a linguistic 
being whose existence lies in the text. This is the darkening metaparable of Kafka which 
celebrates transforming its readers into linguistic beings. Agamben underlines that “[a] 
life that resolves itself completely in writing”, which is what Kafka’s metaparable 
seems to suggests and Kafka does, “corresponds, for Benjamin, to a Torah whose keys 
has been lost.” 326  Then Agamben quotes Benjamin, “I consider the sense of the 
inversion toward which many of Kafka’s allegories tend to lie in an attempt to 
transform life into Scripture.”327 Kafka metamorphoses life into writing, into a Scripture 
without keys. “The absolute intelligibility of a life wholly resolved into writing 
corresponds to the impenetrability of a writing that, having become indecipherable, now 
appears as life.” In Kafka, law that becomes life and life that becomes law face each 
other: “Only at this point” Agamben argues, “do the two terms…(bare life and the form 
of law) abolish each other and enter into a new dimension.”328 In other words, Kafka 
has the door of the Law closed by making bare life and the form of law abolish each 
other. Although no prophet, Kafka thus opens up a new possibility for a different 
relation between law, life and literature. 329 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
Kafka could not better express how he experienced the world he finds himself in 
than with parable. The son falling ill with the sickness of tradition, Kafka subverts the 
traditional use of the parable in Jewish tradition so that it comes to undermine itself, its 
claim on truth. Mashal, which bridges the gap and makes the divine truth accessible to 
the community, becomes in Kafka’s hands what cries out the depth, and thus the 
impossibility of bridging the abyss in between. The Trial is such a masterpiece. It 
emerges as a parable before which not only Josef K. but also Kafka and the reader 
stand. Its peculiar structure is built upon withdrawing truth from anyone who has heard 
its call and has answered it by reading, which means by writing the work. Each step is 
tentative and hesitant. From then on, we are already in the parable with Josef K. Such a 
withdrawal renders the question whether or not there really is a truth to be withdrawn in 
the first place redundant since the only truth at hand is that truth is nowhere to be found. 
Kafka encounters the world; Josef K. encounters the court and the reader encounters 
The Trial. Faced with the inexplicable all three act in a similar way. They try to read the 
inexplicable, and make sense of it. In and through reading they write what is not yet 
written. They write their own parable which engulfs them. By reading, they 
metamorphose into parable themselves; they become essential participants in parable. 
The trial of Kafka, Josef K. and the reader is one and the same: how to read the parable. 
To read is to deceive and be deceived simultaneously. The Trial is the novel of this self-
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deception. It is the Prozeß through which the trial to “explain the inexplicable … turn[s] 
to end in the inexplicable.”330  
“Writing” for Kafka, “is the reward for serving the devil.”331Kafka’s parables do 
not serve the divine. Parable is a double bind that both promises and also withdraws 
truth, which proves perfect match for Kafka’s horribly double life. Parable is located 
right in the middle of the drift, making its hearer suspend over it. Although it has 
traditionally been defined in “a practical-religious, a moral-salvational context,” 332 
Kafka distorts it as much as his existence gets distorted under the weight of the parable 
that entangles him, that is, his world. Bernheimer underlines another possible meaning 
of the Greek verb paraballein. This devilish ─as opposed to the divine─ meaning 
resonates with what Kafka makes of mashal and literature. He argues that, paraballein, 
the Greek verb for to compare from which the word parable derives: 
   “is [etymologically] closely related to diabellein, literally to throw across but 
 figuratively to slander, and hence to diabolus, slanderer, devil. Thus, the parable, 
 which presents itself as a story illustrating a truth, suggests through, its etymology 
 that no truth can be illustrated, that any comparison is a diabolic throwing-across 
 whose very figuration is a slanderous distortion.”333 
In his article titled K, Agamben suggests that the initial K. might in fact stand for 
kalumniator, which means slanderer in Latin, and offers a challenging interpretation 
that sets off from the intricate yet essential relationship between self-accusation and 
law. Slander draws man into being in law.334Could we not think of being entangled in 
law through self-slander to be like being entangled in literature through reading? In 
other words, could we not think of reading as some sort of self-slandering? This study 
has attempted to show that we indeed could. If we roughly define kalumnia ─to 
slander─ in terms of creating that which is not itself there yet as a truth, by telling 
stories in whose emergence we take part in, then to slander is not that far away from 
what Blanchot describes as literary reading. “What is book no one reads? Something 
                                                           
330 Kafka, Franz. “Prometheus” in The Complete Stories. n. pag.  
331 Kafka qtd. in Bernheimer, p. 1264 
332 Sokel, Language and Truth, p. 379 
333 Bernheimer, p. 1264 
334Agamben, Giorgio. “K” in The Work of Giorgio Agamben Law, Literature, Life. Ed. 
Justin Clemens, Nicholas Heron, Alex Murray. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2008. Web. p.15 
 
 
80 
 
that is not yet written.”335 To read, then, is to read that which has not been written yet. It 
is the reader who lets the work, dead and buried in the book, to come to life.336 In other 
words, the work emerges only through the reader’s reading of the book. Diabolical 
literature could resemble diabellein.  
 In “K”, Agamben argues that there is no accusation, guilt or trial other than the 
one Josef K. inflicts on himself by self-slandering: “[T]here is no accusation and no 
trial, at least until the moment in which he who believes he is accused has not accused 
himself.”337 The whole process starts when Josef K. takes part and becomes entangled 
in the process. Such a reading is very much in line with the reading this study has tried 
to achieve. Josef K.’s trial is aesthetically created, by his becoming an artist and 
beginning to read that which is not written. In and through this reading, The Trial both 
as the trial of Josef K. and also the work itself, come to life. The reader of Josef K. also 
creates The Trial aesthetically, by reading. Both the protagonist and the reader are 
creators in that sense, just as Kafka is. All creation begins with reading; reading that 
which has not been written yet. “Every man brings a slanderous trial against himself,”338 
so says Agamben; each one is his own slanderer and thus starts his own trial. Is this not 
what every reader does while reading The Trial? “[The book] does not come into its 
presence as a work except in the space opened by this unique reading, each time the first 
and each time the only.”339 Each unique reading corresponding to each unique trial. 
Every one lets his own trial be; that is the essential point where reading and self-
slandering meet. The self-slanderer is a reader. He reads the parable, just like Josef K. 
does. Before the parable, both Kafka, Josef K. and the reader are equally guilty and 
innocent.  
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